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ABSTRACT
The genomic testing industry is an edifice built on data transpar-
ency: transparent and often unconsented sharing of our genetic
information with researchers to fuel scientific discovery, transparent
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sharing of our test results to help regulators infer whether the tests
are safe and effective, and transparent sharing of our health
information to help treat other patients on the premise that we gain
reciprocity of advantage when each person’s health care is informed
by the best available data about all of us. Transparency undeniably
confers many social benefits but creates risks to the civil rights of the
people whose genetic information is shared. Touted as a major civil
rights law at the time of its passage, the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) has endured ten years of
criticism that its protections are ineffectual, insufficient, or even
unethical and overtly unsafe for the people it aims to protect. At the
center of this controversy are provisions of GINA that expand people’s
access to genetic information that others store about them—a heavily
contested assertion that data transparency implies sharing data not
just with third parties, but with the people whose data are being
shared. This Article traces the decades-long roots of this assertion
and explores pathways to resolve the controversy that engulfs it. It is
important to resolve this controversy. As GINA enters its second
decade, genomics is finally starting to gain sufficient predictive
power to support discriminatory and other nefarious uses that GINA
was designed to prevent. We are entering a positive feedback loop in
which the genomic research that exposes us to risk of unwanted data
disclosures simultaneously fuels discoveries that make such disclo-
sures potentially more damaging.
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INTRODUCTION: GINA’S FIRST DECADE AND THE CHALLENGES
AHEAD
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA)
was born with high expectations.1 The late Senator Edward
Kennedy, who cosponsored the legislation, billed it as “the first
major new civil rights bill of the new century.”2 However, GINA
celebrated its tenth anniversary last year amid festering doubt
about its significance as a civil rights law.3 Scholars dismiss GINA
as having attacked two problems—genetic discrimination in
employment and in health insurance—that, as far as the available
evidence shows, never actually existed.4 GINA fails to address
problems, such as genetic discrimination in long-term care insur-
ance, that genuinely trouble people who undergo genetic testing.5
The centerpiece of GINA’s civil rights protections—an expanded
right of transparency allowing individuals to access genetic
information that third parties store about them—remains mired in
controversy.6 This Article explores the individual access right GINA
created and explains why it is a crucial tool to protect people’s civil
rights as genomic testing grows more common and more informative
in coming years. A convoluted rulemaking history obscured GINA’s
role in creating this important right,7 and GINA enters its second
1. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
2. Kathy L. Hudson et al., Keeping Pace with the Times—The Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2661, 2662 (2008).
3. See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 441 (2010). 
4. See, e.g., id. (“While some examples do exist, both GINA’s advocates and adversaries
agreed that scant evidence indicated a significant history of genetic-information
discrimination.”).
5. See Triangle Privacy Research Hub, Genomics, Precision Medicine, and
Privacy—Refining Privacy to Improve Health Outcomes Symposium, YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zpgXeSZWnmk [https://perma.cc/NZU4-BVCM]. Misha
Rashkin’s statement, which can be found at 00:19:00, discusses some of the deficiencies of
GINA.
6. See Barbara J. Evans, Commentary, HIPAA’s Individual Right of Access to Genomic
Data: Reconciling Safety and Civil Rights, 102 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 5, 5-8 (2018)
(summarizing this controversy briefly); see also infra Part VII.A (explaining the controversy
in detail). 
7. See infra Part VIII.A (explaining the complex rulemaking history that obscured the
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decade like a misunderstood teenager, struggling to be taken
seriously as a civil rights law.
If GINA’s alleged shortcomings caused no widespread harm over
the past decade, this fact lends itself to two possible explanations:
The first is that GINA addressed frivolous problems that did not
matter in 2008 and, by implication, may not matter now. The second
is that GINA addressed important problems and was thwarted in its
initial attempt to do so, but somehow we lucked out and escaped
serious harm, which still awaits unless we take steps now to ensure
that GINA’s essential civil rights protections work as Congress
intended. I disclose that I lean toward this second view.
Congress enacted GINA during a period of enthusiasm that
followed the completion of the Human Genome Project in the year
2000.8 Those were heady times. When announcing initial results of
that project, renowned geneticist Francis Collins declared, “Today,
we celebrate the revelation of the first draft of the human book of
life,”9 and President Bill Clinton gushed, “[t]oday, we are learning
the language in which God created life.”10 Scholars of the era likened
genetic information to a “future diary” that is “uniquely powerful
and uniquely personal” and able to “predict an individual’s ...
medical future” and foretell the future of one’s family members.11
People worried that a drop of spit on a discarded coffee cup or a
strand of hair they shed on the street might enable others to infer
deeply personal secrets: where they came from (for example, is their
provenance of the access right GINA created). 
8. See Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President, Prime Minister Tony
Blair of England (Via Satellite), Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the National Human Genome
Research Institute, and Dr. Craig Venter, President and Chief Scientific Officer, Celera
Genomics Corporation, on the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human Genome
Project (June 26, 2000), http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/clinton
2shtml [https://perma.cc/JGS5-AA2N].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. George J. Annas et al., Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science, Policy, and Practical
Considerations, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 360, 360, 365 (1995).
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ostensible father really their father?),12 their mental defects and
behavioral shortcomings,13 and how and when they will die.14 
GINA, in many respects, was Congress’s response to a mass
delusion that genetic information is more informative than, at least
to date, it has proved to be.15 As we now know, and as cooler heads
knew back then, “[t]he argument from genetic prophecy is not
compelling.”16 As of 2014, of the roughly 10,000 mutations that each
of us has in our genomes,17 fewer than 130 could be conclusively
linked to a clinically significant health impact.18 Behavioral
genetics, after years of explaining practically nothing,19 is only now
beginning to have predictive power, which remains limited. Basic
physical traits like height are influenced by hundreds of interacting
genes, such that viewing people’s genomes usually reveals little
about how tall they are.20 A 2010 study found that simple metrics,
12. See Georgia Lowe et al., How Should We Deal with Misattributed Paternity? A Survey
of Law Public Attitudes, 8 AJOB EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS 234, 234 (2017), https://www.tand
fonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23294515.2017.1378751?needAccess=true [https://perma.cc/2N6S-
JVNS] (discussing “misattributed paternity, where the assumed father is not the biological
father” and noting it is an incidental finding encountered in genetic testing). 
13. Jennifer Kulynych & Henry T. Greely, Clinical Genomics, Big Data, and Electronic
Medical Records: Reconciling Patient Rights with Research When Privacy and Science Collide,
4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 94, 98 (2017) (noting the growing body of knowledge linking genetics
with some mental and behavioral characteristics).
14. See Annas et al., supra note 11, at 360 (discussing the presumed predictive power of
genetics as a “future diary”).
15. See Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and “Future Diaries”: Is Genetic
Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 60, 61 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997)
(citing the past belief, circa 1995, that genetic information is “uniquely powerful”); supra notes
8-11 and accompanying text.
16. Murray, supra note 15, at 64.
17. Isaac S. Kohane et al., Taxonomizing, Sizing, and Overcoming the Incidentalome, 14
GENETICS MED. 399, 403 (2012).
18. Frederick E. Dewey et al., Clinical Interpretation and Implications of Whole-Genome
Sequencing, 311 JAMA 1035, 1040 (2014).
19. See, e.g., Glenn I. Roisman & R. Chris Fraley, The Limits of Genetic Influence: A
Behavior-Genetic Analysis of Infant-Caregiver Relationship Quality and Temperament, 77
CHILD DEV. 1656, 1658, 1663 (2006) (finding that “the role of genetic variation among infants
is trivial,” and questioning the “ubiquity of heritability effects in all domains of psychological
inquiry”).
20. See Is Height Determined by Genetics?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://
ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/traits/height [https://perma.cc/R8YZ-8BG5] (noting that more than
700 gene variants have been discovered that influence height and that more discoveries are
expected).
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such as a person’s waist circumference, are better at predicting
future diabetes risk than genetic “models based on 20 common
independently inherited alleles.”21
If GINA failed in its first decade to save us from genetic discrimi-
nation, it may have been a harmless error because the human
genome was too poorly understood at the time to lend itself to very
many discriminatory uses.22 If GINA failed, then so did the science,
and it all somehow worked out. This does not imply, however, that
GINA’s civil rights protections are unimportant: they may simply
have been premature.
Genetic science is rapidly gaining power to explain and predict.23
As it does so, the potential for genetic discrimination and other
inappropriate uses of genetic information grows more real than it
was ten years ago when Congress enacted GINA.24 It is no longer
“mere theory or science fiction” that a hacker who misappropriates
our genetic information will be able to infer personal characteristics
such as our height, ethnicity, hair color, eye color, and facial fea-
tures.25 The plan for advancing our understanding of the human
genome, and thus our ability to draw such inferences, relies on
research that uses large datasets of genetic and other personal da-
ta, often without individual consent.26 We are entering a positive
feedback loop in which the research that exposes us to risk of
unwanted data disclosures simultaneously fuels the discovery
process that makes disclosures all the more damaging.27 As GINA
enters its second decade, the civil rights protections it affords are
starting to matter. The goal of this Article is to open a debate about
possible solutions to controversies that have undercut GINA’s
protections during its first decade.
21. See Philippa J. Talmud et al., Utility of Genetic and Non-Genetic Risk Factors in
Prediction of Type 2 Diabetes: Whitehall II Prospective Cohort Study, 340 BMJ b4838 (2010),
http://www.bmj.com/content/340/bmj.b4838 [https://perma.cc/8C8K-4732].
22. See Murray, supra note 15, at 64-65 (commenting in the mid-1990s and noting the
weakness of genetic “prophecy”).
23. See, e.g., Kulynych & Greely, supra note 13, at 104.
24. See id. at 96 (noting the expanding predictive power of genetic testing).
25. Id. at 100.
26. See id. at 105 (predicting increased exposure of sensitive information, including
genetic information, to privacy risks as a result of research that relies on large datasets).
27. See id.
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These controversies reflect a clash of competing regulatory
paradigms. Passage of GINA expanded the federal regulatory
program for genetic and genomic testing.28 The program had long
included consumer health and safety regulations (for brevity, “safety
regulations”) that aim to protect the physical health and safety of
people who undergo genetic and genomic testing. Examples of safety
regulations include the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s
(FDA’s) oversight of in vitro diagnostic testing products,29 the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS’s) oversight of
clinical laboratories under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments of 198830 (CLIA) regulations,31 as well as aspects of
federal research regulations that minimize physical safety risks to
research participants.32 GINA added a second layer of regulations:
civil rights laws that address the social consequences of genetic
testing.33 For example, GINA bans unjust discrimination,34 strength-
ens privacy protections,35 and protects rights that foster fruitful
human interactions, such as the rights to speak freely,36 to receive
information relevant to one’s decisionmaking,37 to associate and
assemble with others, to engage in scientific inquiry, and to
participate in political life.38
28. See infra Part VI.
29. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (Supp. IV 2016) (defining FDA-regulated devices); 21 C.F.R.
§ 809.3(a) (2018) (defining in vitro diagnostic products, a category of medical devices that
includes genetic and genomic testing products). 
30. See Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102
Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a).
31. 42 C.F.R. § 493 (2018).
32. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1) (2018) (requiring Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)
overseeing research under the Common Rule to ensure that “[r]isks to subjects are
minimized”); see also 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(1) (2018) (imposing this same requirement on IRBs
reviewing FDA regulated research); 21 C.F.R. §§ 312, 812 (2018) (outlining FDA’s
investigational new drug and investigational device exemption regulations, which protect
research participants from exposure to unreasonable levels of risk from experimental drugs
and devices used in research). 
33. James Buchwalter et al., Definition and Nature of Civil Rights, 14 C.J.S. § 1 (2018)
(“A civil right refers to rights arising under federal and state civil rights laws and the federal
and state constitutions, embracing the rights due from one to citizen to another, pertaining
to a person by virtue of citizenship in a state or community.”).
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra Part IV.B.
36. See infra Part IV.D.
37. See infra Part IV.B.
38. See infra Part IV.D.
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The transition to a broader federal regulatory program for genetic
testing has not gone smoothly. GINA led to the creation, in 2014,39
of a federally protected, individual right of access40 to genetic in-
formation stored at laboratories covered by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 199641 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule,
which is a major federal medical privacy regulation.42 The 2014
Privacy Rule amendments expanded individuals’ access to labo-
ratory-held data,43 including genetic and genomic information as
well as assorted other diagnostic test results that laboratories hold
in their files.44 Insofar as these amendments pertain to genetic
information, they were implementing a congressional civil rights
mandate stated in GINA.45 Failing to appreciate this fact, safety
regulators and some members of the bioethics and medical com-
munities have opposed HIPAA’s right of access to genomic informa-
tion, citing safety concerns.46 These safety concerns are most intense
with respect to genomic information generated during research.47
Research data, for various reasons, may fall short of the quality
standard suitable for use in clinical healthcare, but can affect
people’s civil rights and they need access to it.48
The compliance date for HIPAA-covered laboratories49 to provide
access to laboratory-held data was October 6, 2014.50 Four years
39. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
40. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018). 
41. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
42. 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164.
43. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 7290.
44. See infra Part VI.B.2.
45. See infra Part VIII.A.
46. See infra Part VII.
47. See infra Part VII.A.1.
48. See infra Part II.
49. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2018) (providing that the HIPAA regulations, including the
Privacy Rule, apply to healthcare providers such as physicians, clinics, hospitals, laboratories
and various other entities, such as insurers, that transmit “any health information in
electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter [the
Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA]” and to their business associates); see also
id. § 160.103 (defining the terms “covered entity” and “business associate”). 
50. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290, 7292 (Feb. 6, 2014) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
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later, many individuals face ongoing problems accessing their
data.51 Steven Keating, diagnosed with brain cancer while pursuing
Ph.D. studies several years ago, has chronicled his saga to overcome
the access barriers this Article discusses.52 After surgery, he
donated his tumor tissue to a research study, assuming he would
have access to the genome sequencing results, but he was denied
access based on concerns that the research laboratory was not
certified under the CLIA regulations.53 “I wanted to see my sequence
and share it with the world to benefit science. Instead, the reward
for donating valuable tumor tissue was a legal barrier preventing
me from seeing my future.”54
Genomic research laboratories are caught in a crossfire of
conflicting directives from three subagencies within the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The three are:
(1) the FDA, which regulates medical devices including some genetic
and genomic testing products;55 (2) the CMS, which regulates
clinical laboratories under its CLIA program;56 and (3) the Office for
Civil Rights (OCR), which administers the HIPAA Privacy Rule.57
Many researchers additionally find themselves squeezed between
HIPAA’s apparent directive to grant individual access and an
51. See, e.g., Steven Keating, Can a Hospital “Share” Button Save Us?, GENOME MAG.
(Mar. 13, 2017), http://genomemag.com/can-a-hospital-share-button-save-us/ [https://perma.cc/
E2ZQ-G54R]; see also Carolyn T. Lye et al., Assessment of U.S. Hospital Compliance with
Regulations for Patients’ Requests for Medical Records, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2705850 [https://perma.cc/
8J9J-QKM3] (providing empirical data demonstrating the difficulty individuals experience
exercising their HIPAA access rights).
52. See Keating, supra note 51; see also K. McGowan, The Man Who Dissected His Own
Brain, WIRED (Feb. 11, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/the-man-who-
dissected-his-own-brain/ [https://perma.cc/YLE7-FYSA] (interviewing Keating).
53. See Keating, supra note 51.
54. See id.
55. See Regulation of Genetic Tests, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.genome.gov/10002335/regulation-of-genetic-tests/ [https://perma.cc/9TGB-ET7W].
56. See id.
57. Cf. Genetic Information, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (June 16, 2017), https://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professional/special-topics/genetic-information/index.html [https://
perma.cc/8UAS-N2L4].
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Institutional Review Board (IRB)58 that considers it unethical to do
so under various federal research regulations.59
This Article ascribes these conflicts to growing pains within an
evolving federal regulatory program for genomic testing.60 As new
civil rights protections were added after GINA, they were not
adeptly61 integrated into the fabric of preexisting safety regulations.
The first step toward successful integration is to understand that
HIPAA’s access right is not a safety regulation and should not be
judged as such.62 Rather, it is a regulation that aims to balance
privacy and transparency in a way that allows socially beneficial
uses of genomic data while protecting people’s civil rights.63 It rests
on legal precedents that date back to the 1970s and has clear ethical
justifications enunciated in studies Congress commissioned at two
critical junctures; first, as the modern information age started to
unfold in the 1970s and, second, as the Human Genome Project
began to bear fruit in the late 1990s.64
Recent debate about HIPAA’s access right is often couched in
bioethical and safety-related terms: Is individual access to genomic
data normatively justified, consistent with bioethical standards, and
safe? And if not, can consumer safety regulators like FDA and CMS
find jurisdiction to block HIPAA access? This Article argues that
these are not appropriate questions to ask about a federally pro-
tected civil right. Civil rights enjoy a special status in U.S. federal
law. Public officials—including safety regulators—are obliged to
respect people’s civil rights.65 The most fruitful way forward is to
58. An Institutional Review Board is a private ethics review body that oversees the ethical
conduct of research at institutions regulated by the Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects (Common Rule). See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2018). 
59. See supra note 32 (listing examples of federal research regulations that prescribe the
use of IRBs).
60. See infra Part VII.
61. See infra Part VII.
62. See Evans, supra note 6, at 5.
63. See generally Barbara J. Evans, The Interplay of Privacy and Transparency in Health
Care: The HIPAA Privacy Rule as a Case Study, in TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH
CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW AND ETHICS (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen,
Carmel Shachar & Barbara J. Evans eds., forthcoming 2019) (reviewing HHS’s efforts, when
designing the Privacy Rule, to balance socially beneficial data uses with the individual’s
interest in privacy). 
64. See infra Part VII.B.
65. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012); see also infra Part VII.A.
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look for approaches that affirm people’s civil rights while making
the exercise of those rights as safe as it possibly can be—recogniz-
ing, however, that civil rights have never been cost-free, and au-
tonomous individuals often embrace risks to claim their civil rights.
This Article identifies legally workable options for advancing safe-
ty, bioethical values, and civil rights simultaneously, so that GINA
can achieve its original promise, which was to protect genomic civil
rights.66
I. CIVIL RIGHTS IN BIOETHICAL DISCOURSE
After a recent article referred to HIPAA access as a civil right,67
it drew protests from some scientists and bioethicists who regard
such language as provocative.68 No provocation is intended.
Whatever special valence the term “civil right” may have in popular
culture, it has a simple dictionary meaning, which is the intended
meaning here.69 Civil rights are legally enforceable rights and
protections within the social and political spheres.70 “Enforceable”
means that people whose civil rights are violated can seek redress,
such as monetary damages or an injunction to force others to respect
their rights.71 Civil rights are legal creations, protected by laws such
as the U.S. Constitution, federal and state statutes, and regulations
implementing those statutes.72
Civil rights differ from natural rights that inhere in the nature of
persons, from moral and bioethical claims of right that are not
legally enforceable, and from rights incidental to the ownership of
property.73 On this last point, civil rights generally attach to people,
66. See infra Part VIII.
67. See Evans, supra note 6.
68. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Dreyfus & Mark E. Sobel, Concern About Justifying the Release
of Genomic Data as a Civil Right, 103 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 163, 163-65 (2018) (expressing
concern, in a letter to the editor, about characterizing HIPAA’s access right as a civil right).
69. See, e.g., Civil Rights, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “civil right”
as “Any of the individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and by the
13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as well as by legislation such as the Voting Rights
Act. Civil rights include esp[ecially] the right to vote, the right of due process, and the right
of equal protection under the law”). 
70. See Buchwalter et al., supra note 33, § 1.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See id. § 3.
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not to property.74 Data ownership, if it existed, would grant rights
for owners to use, access, and control their data, but these rights
seemingly would evaporate when owners transfer their data to
someone else: property rights generally run with the property and
pass to the next owner.75 Jessica Roberts correctly observes that a
property right in one’s own genetic information could be designed in
a way that affords significant protection of individual rights.76
Conceivably, genetic data ownership might be defined as including
an ongoing right of access to one’s data that endures even after the
data are sold or transferred to another person. To date, however,
this has not occurred. Several states have enacted laws granting
individuals a property interest in their own genetic information,77
and a few more states have considered such legislation.78 But such
laws are generally vague about what genetic property rights
entail,79 and none provides a right of ongoing access after transfer
or sale.80 Popular discourse about genetic data ownership often
draws an analogy to fee simple ownership of a house.81 The popular
74. See id. (noting that civil rights “pertain originally and essentially to humans”).
75. Cf. id.
76. See Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105,
1148 (2018).
77. See SETH AXELRAD, AM. SOC’Y OF LAW, MED. & ETHICS, STATE STATUTES DECLARING
GENETIC INFORMATION TO BE PERSONAL PROPERTY, https://www.aslme.org/dna_04/reports/axel
rad4.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2T2-7XGN] (listing statutes in Alaska, Colorado, Florida, and
Georgia that recognize individual property rights in genetic information); see also ALASKA
STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (2018); FLA. STAT.
§ 760.40(2)(a) (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (2018).
78. See, e.g., H.B. 1220, 84th Legis. Sess. (Tex. 2015); H.B. 1260, 87th Legis. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (S.D. 2012); H.B. 2110, 82d Legis. Sess. (Tex. 2011).
79. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Wagner & Dan Vorhaus, On Genetic Rights and States: A Look
at South Dakota and Around the U.S., PRIVACY REP. (Mar. 20, 2012), https://theprivacyreport.
com/2012/03/20/on-genetic-rights-and-states-a-look-at-south-dakota-and-around-the-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/JNX2-83N9] (discussing the areas of ambiguity in South Dakota’s proposed
bill).
80. See ALA. CODE § 18.13.010 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7 (2018); FLA. STAT.
§ 760.40 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2018).
81. See Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69,
89 (2011) (noting the vagueness of many data ownership proposals and suggesting that
individual data ownership would differ from fee simple ownership of a house and might
resemble riparian ownership or copyright); Roberts, supra note 76, at 1169-71; see also Mark
A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Commentary, Ownership of Medical Information, 301 JAMA
1282, 1283-84 (2009) (noting the popular tendency to liken data ownership to fee simple
ownership but pointing out that data ownership would differ from familiar “[o]wnership of
houses and cars”).
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conception of home ownership has never included a right for former
owners to enjoy ongoing access to sit in the living room after a sale.
Thus, it seems unlikely that genetic data ownership, if it existed,
would provide an inalienable, enduring right of access to one’s own
data wherever the data happened to be stored.
In a similar fashion, a bioethical right of informed consent offers
few ongoing protections once consent is improvidently granted to a
downstream data user who distributes one’s data carelessly and
widely.82 Withdrawing consent may—but does not always—block
recipients’ further use of a person’s data, nor is it an effective way
to force privacy, data security, data destruction, and data transfer
policies to guard consenters’ civil rights.83
A law creating data-related civil rights, in contrast, could be
drafted in a way that gives people ongoing access to, control over,
and protections for their data even when the data are held by
others. GINA’s drafters appreciated the limits of consent and
ownership as mechanisms to address the concerns people feel about
storage, use, and disclosure of their genetic information.84 GINA
instead embraced a civil rights approach.85 Civil rights are simply
a different legal technique for protecting some of the same individ-
ual interests that many bioethicists and property theorists also seek
to protect.86
The field of bioethics has always been attentive to civil rights-
related issues—for example, privacy, stigmatization and discrimina-
tion, and the need to be informed when consenting to uses of one’s
data.87 But bioethical literature rarely frames these issues in the
82. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of Individual
Choice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1765, 1797 (2010) (“Consent requirements [imposed by the HIPAA
Privacy Rule] not only impede health research, but may actually undermine privacy
interests.”).
83. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH IN-
FORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTHCARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD 2, 28
(2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-
it-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/33NN-9YMT] (discussing the weakness of informed consent as
a mechanism to protect data privacy and security).
84. See Hudson, supra note 2, at 2662 (noting weaknesses in the framework of genetic
privacy protections prior to GINA).
85. See id. (characterizing GINA as a civil rights law); infra Part II.
86. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
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language of civil rights. This may reflect historical factors. The
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (SACGT),
working in the late 1990s while the Human Genome Project was
still a work in progress, identified four criteria for assessing the
benefits and risks of genetic testing: analytic validity,88 clinical
validity,89 clinical utility90 (sometimes called “actionability”),91 and
social consequences.92 Public comments confirmed that these criteria
capture concerns people feel about the safety of genetic testing.93
The SACGT’s formulation appended social consequences—a focus
of civil rights law—to the end of a list of safety-related criteria.94
This suggested a mindset that civil rights are subordinate to safety
or—worse—it suggested a complete blurring of the two as if social
consequences are part of the risk/benefit ratio safety regulators
should use to assess whether genetic testing is safe.95 In practice,
ENHANCING THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT 8, 20
(2000), https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/oversight_report.pdf [https://perma.
cc/83C3-MGK2].
88. See id. at 15 n.10 (explaining that analytical validity is an indicator of how well a test
measures the property or characteristic it is intended to measure and addresses such matters
as the test’s accuracy, rate of false positives and negatives, and reliability in the sense of
repeatedly getting the same result).
89. See id. at 15 n.11 (explaining that clinical validity refers to the accuracy with which
a test predicts the presence or absence of a clinical condition or predisposition, addressing
whether there is a strong and well validated association between having a particular gene
variant and having a particular health condition, and asking whether knowing that a person
has the gene variant offers meaningful insight into the person’s health or reproductive risks);
see also Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Genetic
Research Results to Study Participants: Updated Guidelines from a National Heart, Lung, and
Blood Institute Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 575 (2010)
(expressing this concept by stating that a test result has an “established” meaning).
90. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 87, at 15 n.12 (“Clinical
utility refers to the usefulness of the test and the value of the information to the person being
tested. If a test has utility, it means that the results—positive or negative—provide
information that is of value to the person being tested because he or she can use that
information to seek an effective treatment or preventive strategy. Even if no interventions are
available to treat or prevent the disease or condition, there may be benefits associated with
knowledge of the result.”).
91. See Fabsitz et al., supra note 89, at 575 (“Actionable means that disclosure has the
potential to lead to an improved health outcome; there must be established therapeutic or
preventive interventions available or other available actions that may change the course of
the disease.”).
92. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETIC TESTING, supra note 87, at 15.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, CONG. OF THE U.S., ASSESSING THE EFFICACY
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consumer safety regulators like FDA and CMS have neither the
legal authority nor appropriate staffing to address social aspects of
technologies they regulate; separate federal agencies administer
civil rights regulations.96
Bioethical discourse about safety and civil rights has been further
blurred because the traditional Common Rule97 (the longstanding
federal research regulation, for which 2017 amendments took effect
in January 2019)98 combined both types of regulation. The tradi-
tional Common Rule engaged ethics review bodies, known as IRBs,
in a safety regulatory function when minimizing the physical risks
of research, but in a civil rights function when assessing privacy
risks in informational research that stores, discloses, or uses peo-
ple’s data or when assessing the adequacy of informed consent.99
These mixed oversight responsibilities perhaps made sense when
the Common Rule was drafted in the late 1970s and 1980s because
the HIPAA Privacy Rule did not yet exist.100 The traditional
Common Rule—the federal regulation that is most familiar to many
bioethicists—was a muddle of safety and civil rights law.101 This
AND SAFETY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 17-18 (1978) (conceiving medical product safety as
a risk/benefit ratio with a product deemed “safe” if its risks are acceptable in relation to its
benefits).
96. See Office for Civil Rights (OCR), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.
gov/ocr/index.html [https://perma.cc/F6S6-NCMR] (describing the separate subagency within
HHS that is responsible for civil rights enforcement); see also Civil Rights Enforcement
Through Other Agencies, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.hhs.
gov/civil-rights/for-providers/compliance-enforcement/enforcement-other-agencies/index.html
[https://perma.cc/HH3L-TTRK].
97. See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects (Common Rule), 45
C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. A (2018). 
98. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 and in various other regulations of implementing
agencies); see also Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects: Delay of the Revisions
to the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 83 Fed. Reg. 2885 (Jan. 22, 2018)
(extending the effective date of the new Common Rule until July 19, 2018); Federal Policy for
the Protection of Human Subjects: Six Month Delay of the General Compliance Date of
Revisions While Allowing the Use of Three Burden-Reducing Provisions During the Delay
Period, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,497 (June 19, 2018) (further delaying implementation until January
21, 2019).
99. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7149, 7154.
100. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (finalizing the HIPAA Privacy Rule
in December 2000).
101. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 46.
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may have suggested that blurring safety and civil rights is normal
in regulatory practice when, in fact, it is not.
A major goal of the 2017 Common Rule revisions was to disentan-
gle safety and civil rights by ceding civil-rights oversight to the
HIPAA regulations and focusing the Common Rule on the physical
risks of research—that is, on safety issues.102 Under the revised
Common Rule, uses and disclosures of data that are subject to
HIPAA regulation as research, public health, or health care opera-
tions will be exempt from the Common Rule.103 In other words, the
Common Rule will no longer regulate these activities.104 The
preamble to the 2017 Final Rule explains that this exemption avoids
duplication in cases where data privacy is already protected by
HIPAA.105 This change may help distinguish the concepts of safety
and civil rights in future bioethical discourse. Common Rule IRBs
will still have residual oversight responsibilities for data privacy in
contexts where HIPAA does not apply, so some mixing of responsi-
bilities will continue.106
102. See, e.g., Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects: Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933 (proposed Sept. 8, 2015); Human Subjects Research
Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and
Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,514 (advance notice of proposed
rulemaking provided July 26, 2011) (discussing the benefits of reducing Common Rule
oversight of privacy risks in HIPAA-regulated informational research).
103. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7261-62
(adopting a new regulation at § 46.104(d)(4)(iii) which provides, “[e]xcept as described in
paragraph (a) of this section, the following categories of human subjects research are exempt
from this policy: ... (4) Secondary research ... [t]he research involves only information
collection and analysis involving the investigator’s use of identifiable health information when
that use is regulated under 45 CFR parts 160 and 164, subparts A and E, for the purposes of
‘health care operations’ or ‘research’ as those terms are defined at 45 CFR 164.501 or for
‘public health activities and purposes’ as described under 45 CFR 164.512(b)”). 
104. See supra note 98.
105. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7194
(“HIPAA also provides protections in the research context for the information that would be
subject to this exemption (e.g., clinical records), such that additional Common Rule
requirements for consent should be unnecessary in those contexts.... This provision introduces
a clearer distinction between when the Common Rule and the HIPAA Privacy Rule apply to
research in order to avoid duplication of regulatory burden. We believe that the HIPAA
protections are adequate for this type of research, and that it is unduly burdensome and
confusing to require applying the protections of both HIPAA and an additional set of
protections.”).
106. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(iii) (2018).
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The historical blurring of safety and civil rights in bioethics
disguised a problem that is glaringly evident after GINA. Safety and
civil rights regulations are distinct bodies of law serving different
objectives that sometimes call for conflicting policies on particular
issues, such as “whether individual access to genomic data should
be narrow or broad.”107 This Article explores how—and why—safety
and civil rights collided after GINA and possible ways to reconcile
the two.
II. FORMALIZING GENOMIC CIVIL RIGHTS AFTER GINA
GINA marked a shift to a more formal federal regulatory struc-
ture to address the social consequences of genetic testing.108
Informal oversight, as opposed to governmental regulation, had long
been part of the framework to protect individuals who undergo
genetic and genomic testing. In the early 1990s, when Congress
established the National Center for Human Genome Research,109
Congress called for “‘not less than’ 5% of the [National Institutes of
Health (NIH)] Human Genome Project budget to be set aside for
research on the ethical, legal, and social implications of genomic
science.”110 The resulting Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications
(ELSI) research program is estimated to have funded over 480
scholarly research projects costing more than $300 million by
2014.111 This program has been described as a mechanism through
which Congress “legislatively instantiated” its commitment to
address the social consequences of genetic and genomic testing.112
“Instantiate” is not a legal term; it simply means to provide an
107. See Evans, supra note 6, at 7.
108. See Hudson et al., supra note 2, at 2661-62 (summarizing GINA’s protections).
109. This Center is now known as the National Human Genome Research Institute within
the National Institutes of Health (NIH). See About the Institute, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES.
INST. (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.genome.gov/27534788/about-the-institute/ [https://perma.cc/
325N-RWXC].
110. Jean E. McEwen et al., The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Program of the
National Human Genome Research Institute: Reflections on an Ongoing Experiment, 15 ANN.
REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 481, 482 (2014) (quoting the National Institutes of Health
Revitalization Act of 1993 § 1521, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122, 180 (1993)).
111. Id. at 483.
112. Id. at 482.
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example or a specific instance.113 If it seemed that Congress was ap-
pointing ELSI scholars to regulate the social consequences of ge-
netic testing, this was just a pleasant scholarly conceit. Congress
had other plans.
GINA emerged in 2008 at a critical juncture when genomic
testing was maturing from a research pursuit into a vibrant clinical
and consumer testing industry that routinely stores, shares, and
uses large volumes of personal data in ways that the tested
individuals may not even be aware of.114 GINA is most famous for
addressing two narrow problems: genetic discrimination in employ-
ment and in health insurance.115 Its broader significance as a
genomic civil rights law lay in two low-key provisions in which
Congress defined the types of genetic information that raise civil
rights concerns116 and appointed a federal regulator with broad
rulemaking authority to address those concerns.117
Section 102 of GINA defines the “genetic information” that, in
Congress’s view, has the potential to affect people’s civil rights.118
This definition includes virtually any information that a genetic test
may reveal about a person, as well as other genetic information that
can be inferred from genetic tests and manifest disease of the per-
son’s family members.119 GINA’s definition pays no heed to wheth-
er the information is reliable or unreliable, clinically significant or
113. See Instantiate, MERRIAM WEBSTER (2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/instantiate [https://perma.cc/5V5Y-8PDS].
114. See Kulynych & Greely, supra note 13, at 94-95 (noting “[w]idespread use of medical
records for research, without consent” and noting the increased presence of genomic
information in medical records (emphasis omitted)). 
115. Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an
Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 632 (2011) (explaining that GINA took
an anticlassification approach that “comprehensively prohibits health insurers and employers
from considering genetic information”); id. at 597 (noting that GINA “protects individuals
from any intentional differential treatment by health insurers or employers based on genetic
information”). 
116. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 102(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
91(d)(15)-(19) (2012).
117. Id. § 105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9).
118. See id. § 102(a)(4) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(16)(A)) (amending the Public
Health Service Act at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d) to define genetic information as meaning, “with
respect to any individual, information about—(i) such individual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic
tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder
in family members of such individual”).
119. Id.
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not, or whether it was generated in a research or clinical labora-
tory.120
This definition opened a gulf between consumer safety regula-
tions and genomic civil rights regulations. Central tenets of safety
regulation are that genetic information is potentially dangerous
unless it meets quality standards appropriate for clinical health
care,121 and that data generated during research should be shared
with individuals only if the information can be confidently traced
to the individual and has analytic validity, clinical validity, and/or
clinical utility/actionability.122 Before GINA, there was ongoing
120. See generally id.
121. See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OPTIMIZING
FDA’S REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF NEXT GENERATION SEQUENCING DIAGNOSTIC TESTS—PRE-
LIMINARY DISCUSSION PAPER (Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/
newsevents/workshopsconferences/ucm427869.pdf [https://perma.cc/837T-BQLT] (focusing on
analytical performance and clinical performance—that is, analytic and clinical validity—as
key aspects of whether genomic tests are safe for clinical uses and providing examples of mis-
diagnoses and other harms that might occur if tests lack these attributes). 
122. See, e.g., 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIO-
LOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 71 (1999) (“Experts disagree
about whether findings from research should be communicated to [research participants], al-
though most do believe that findings should not be conveyed unless they are confirmed and
reliable and constitute clinically significant or scientifically relevant information. Those who
oppose revealing unconfirmed findings argue that the harms that could result from revealing
preliminary data are serious, including anxiety or unnecessary (and possibly harmful) medical
interventions.”); Ebony B. Bookman et al., Reporting Genetic Results in Research Studies:
Summary and Recommendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140A AM. J. MED. GENETICS
1033, 1037 (2006) (counseling “extreme caution” in returning results that are preliminary and
not validated by other studies). Analytic validity is widely viewed as the bare minimum
quality standard for return of results from research. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf, The Role of Law
in the Debate over Return of Research Results and Incidental Findings: The Challenge of De-
veloping Law for Translational Science, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 435, 446 (2012) (noting “a
near-universal demand [in the literature] for analytic validity as a precondition” for returning
results and incidental findings). Many commentators would require, in addition, that the
results should have some level of clinical significance (clinical validity and/or utility). See, e.g.,
Karen J. Maschke, Returning Genetic Research Results: Considerations for Existing No-Return
and Future Biobanks, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 559, 559 (2012) (citing the fact that most
genetic research results have uncertain clinical significance as a reason why many biobanks
adopt a “no-return policy”); Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human
Subjects Research: Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 235 (2008)
(noting that many commentators call for results to be returned only if they have clinical val-
idity, that is, a well-established clinical or reproductive significance); id. at 231 (“Disclosure
should occur only when findings are valid and confirmed, have significant health implications,
and the health problem can be treated.”); see also Fabsitz et al., supra note 89, at 578 (noting
the controversy surrounding return of results that have personal utility but not clinical
significance/validity/utility). But see Ingrid A. Holman & Patrick L. Taylor, The Informed
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debate within the bioethics community about whether individual
findings from genetic and genomic research even amount to genetic
information.123 An influential 1999 report by the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission opined that “preliminary results do not yet
constitute ‘information’ since ‘until an initial finding is confirmed,
there is no reliable information’ to communicate to subjects.”124 The
perception that unreliable genetic findings are not genetic infor-
mation reflects a consumer health and safety regulatory mindset. 
GINA recognized that protecting civil rights requires a different
mindset. People can be deprived of civil rights based on unreliable
as well as reliable information that is attributed to them; indeed,
unreliable data are sometimes the most damaging. If somebody
else’s data are in your file as a result of a laboratory error, the data
obviously are useless and potentially even dangerous from a medical
standpoint,125 but can also affect your civil rights. You could face
genetic discrimination if a sicker person’s information is wrongly
attributed to you. To discover and correct the error—and protect
your civil rights—you need access to the data that are (rightly or
wrongly) stored under your name. Variants with uncertain clinical
significance (or no clinical significance at all) can imperil a person’s
civil rights. For example, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
genetic markers that law enforcement agencies use to identify
suspected criminals are from noncoding regions of the genome126 and
have no clinical validity or utility whatsoever.127 Still, if a research
Cohort Oversight Board: From Values to Architecture, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 669, 676
(2012) (supporting disclosure of information even if its clinical significance is uncertain but
requiring that it be analytically valid).
123. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 71-72.
124. See id. at 71 (quoting Charles R. MacKay, Ethical Issues in Research Design and Con-
duct: Developing a Test to Detect Carriers of Huntington’s Disease, 6 IRB 1, 3 (1984)).
125. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 121
(noting that inaccurate genomic tests “can lead to patients receiving the wrong diagnosis, the
wrong treatment or no treatment at all even when effective therapy is available” (internal
citations omitted); see also Ellen Gabler, Weak Oversight Allows Lab Failures to Put Patients
at Risk, J. SENTINEL (May 17, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://archive.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdog
reports/weak-oversight-allows-lab-failures-to-put-patients-at-risk-303445851.html/
[https://perma.cc/V3H4-KBMU] (providing examples of medical harms that can occur as a
result of mix-ups and misdiagnoses in the laboratory setting).
126. See What Is CODIS?, NAT’L INST. JUST. (July 16, 2010), https://www.nij.gov/journals/
266/Pages/backlogs-codis.aspx [https://perma.cc/2RJL-JLWW] (describing the FBI’s Combined
DNA Index System and its uses).
127. See D.H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of
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laboratory stores people’s CODIS markers in their genome sequenc-
ing files, these data later could be used to link them (or one of their
family members) to a crime.128 Worse still, if someone else’s CODIS
markers are in their files because of a laboratory mix-up, they could
be falsely accused.129
Section 105 of GINA ordered the Secretary of HHS to place all
genetic information held at HIPAA-covered facilities under the pro-
tection of the HIPAA regulations.130 Since it was first promulgated
in December 2000,131 the HIPAA Privacy Rule has provided privacy
protections for “health information” (often referred to as protected
health information or “PHI,” the information that HIPAA pro-
tects).132 However, the definition of “health information” has chang-
ed over time. The 1996 HIPAA statute supplied a definition of this
term.133 The problem with this 1996 definition was that it only
seemed to include genetic information that had a well-established
relationship to a health condition.134 Genetic information with an-
alytic validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility seemed to qualify
Private Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 81 (2007).
128. See What is CODIS?, supra note 126.
129. See Sarah Rackley Olson, CODIS: Combined DNA Index System, FORENSIC SCI. N.C.
(Sept. 13, 2011, 2:38 AM), https://ncforensics.wordpress.com/2011/09/13/codis-combined-dna-
index-system/ [https://perma.cc/6ZFP-MVQP].
130. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 2008 § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9(a)
(2012) (calling, in the section entitled “Application of the HIPAA Regulations to Genetic In-
formation,” for HHS/OCR to amend the definition of “protected health information” that
HIPAA protects to include all of the genetic information within GINA’s broad definition and
ordering the Secretary of Health and Human Services to implement the change within one
year); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9(b)(1) (stating, in a new section introduced by GINA’s § 105,
that Congress deems “genetic information,” as broadly defined by GINA at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
91, to be health information, for purposes of making it subject to HIPAA’s privacy protec-
tions).
131. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (promulgating the original
HIPAA Privacy Rule).
132. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2001).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2012) (“The term ‘health information’ means any in-
formation, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that—(A) is created or received
by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school
or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (B) relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an
individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an
individual.”).
134. See id. 
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as “health information” and enjoy HIPAA’s privacy protections.135
This protected, for example, the fact that a person has a genetic
variant known to be associated with diabetes, Huntington’s disease,
cystic fibrosis, or high blood pressure. But genetic findings lacking
clear associations with health conditions were not clearly subject to
HIPAA’s privacy protections.136 Thus, the original Privacy Rule did
not seem to protect genetic information bearing on a person’s be-
havior, intellect, criminal tendencies, athletic prowess, or physical
appearance, or the fact that a person has variants for which the
significance is not yet understood.137 This left an important gap in
privacy protection as genomic testing grew more common in recent
years. 
Unlike traditional genetic tests that examine a discrete number
of specific genes already known to have a clinically significant
relationship to human health, genomic tests scan a large swathe of
a person’s genome.138 Each of us has on the order of three million
genetic variants—the modern euphemism for mutations—in our
whole genomes (the entirety of our genetic material), and we have
about 10,000 variants in our exomes (the roughly 1.5 percent of the
genome that contains our genes, manufactures proteins, and in-
fluences our physical characteristics).139 For most of these variants,
the clinical validity and utility are not yet known.140 A 2014 study
found that only 90 to 127 variants have a well-established clinical
significance based on the science at that time.141 These clinically
significant variants seemingly amount to health information and
would have received privacy protection under the original Privacy
Rule, but the other 9875 or so variants that each of us carries are
135. See id.; supra notes 88-90. 
136. See § 1320d(4).
137. See id.
138. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 121
(“Unlike other laboratory tests that typically detect a single or a defined number of substances
to diagnose a limited set of conditions, a single [genome sequencing] test can identify thou-
sands—even millions—of genetic variants.”).
139. See id.; Kohane et al., supra note 17, at 400; Leah Eisenstadt, What Is Exome
Sequencing?, BROAD INST. (Oct. 15, 2010), https://www.broadinstitute.org/blog/what-exome-
sequencing [https:// perma.cc/4LQ5-ELCE].
140. See Dewey et al., supra note 18, at 1039.
141. Id.
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not necessarily health-related and did not qualify for privacy pro-
tection under that old standard.
Even now, genomic testing is only slowly moving into wide clin-
ical use because it is still rare for health insurers to cover the cost
of gene sequencing in clinical settings.142 As a result, most of the
gene sequencing test results currently stored in the United States—
and thus in need of privacy protection—were generated during past
research studies, and research studies continue to play a large role
in generating new genomic information.143 Data generated during
research do not always meet the standards of quality needed for use
in clinical health care.144 These data were at risk of slipping through
the protections of the original Privacy Rule—a problem that Con-
gress addressed by passing GINA.145
There are two ways that research results can fail to meet the
standards of quality that are expected of data destined for use in
clinical healthcare. First, the data themselves may be of subclinical-
quality in the sense of lacking analytic validity, clinical validity,
and/or clinical utility/actionability.146 This situation reflects a sub-
stantive problem with data quality: the data, while useful for re-
search, are not sufficiently reliable and well-understood to qualify
for use in healthcare settings. Second, the laboratory that generat-
ed the data may not have complied with regulatory standards re-
quired of laboratories that perform tests as part of clinical health-
care. In particular, some research laboratories do not comply with
142. See generally Patricia A. Deverka & Jennifer C. Dreyfus, Clinical Integration of Next
Generation Sequencing: Coverage and Reimbursement Challenges, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22
(2014) (discussing difficulties obtaining coverage for clinical genomic testing). 
143. See Ryan L. Collins, Strength in Numbers: Genetic Sequencing of Large Populations
Is Shaping the Future of Medicine, HARV. U. SCI. NEWS BLOG (June 5, 2017), http://sitn.
hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/strength-numbers-genetic-sequencing-large-populations-shaping-
future-medicine/ [https://perma.cc/R4D6-3UHS] (discussing the large number of gene se-
quencing tests that are generated in research studies).
144. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf & Barbara J. Evans, Return of Results and Data to Study
Participants, 362 SCIENCE 159, 159 (2018) (“Some research results will meet clinical stan-
dards of quality, but many will not, because research seeks to advance understanding.”); see
also Wylie Burke et al., Return of Results: Ethical and Legal Distinctions Between Research
and Clinical Care, 166 AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART C (SEMINARS MED. GENETICS) 105, 106-07
(2014) (distinguishing the goals and data quality requirements of research and clinical care).
145. See infra this Part.
146. See supra notes 88-91. 
2042 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2017
the federal CLIA regulations.147 This situation is in the nature of a
legal technicality and has only a weak relationship to the data’s sub-
stantive quality.148
Research laboratories can, and often do, produce genomic results
that have “clinical quality” in the sense of being analytically valid
and having a well-understood clinical validity and utility.149 Con-
versely, clinical genomic tests—tests performed at CLIA-compliant
clinical laboratories for the purpose of informing healthcare deci-
sions—reveal a lot of subclinical quality information, unsuitable for
use in clinical care as a byproduct of detecting the few variants that
have known clinical significance.150 Whether test results have clin-
ical quality or subclinical quality thus is not a function of where the
results were generated, that is, at a clinical versus research lab-
oratory.
The fact that a research laboratory complies with the CLIA
regulations151 provides no assurance that the data are of clinical
quality.152 Congress enacted the CLIA statute in response to reports
of inaccurate results from tests used in cervical cancer screening,
and the CLIA regulations play a useful role in enhancing the safety
of laboratory tests used in clinical health care.153 It is not an
147. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2018) (providing an exception that allows some research
laboratories to operate without having to comply with the CLIA regulations).
148. See infra this Part.
149. See Gail P. Jarvik et al., Return of Genomic Results to Research Participants: The
Floor, the Ceiling, and the Choices in Between, 94 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 818, 823 (2014)
(noting that clinically “actionable information might be learned from assays that cannot easily
be confirmed in a CLIA-compliant laboratory”).
150. See generally Dewey et al., supra note 18, at 1041 (discussing how few genetic variants
currently have known clinical significance); Jarvik et al., supra note 149, at 818-23 (discussing
data produced during genome sequencing).
151. A laboratory is considered CLIA-compliant if it either holds a CLIA certificate or is
exempt from the CLIA regulations. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.2. A laboratory is CLIA-exempt if it
has been licensed by a state whose laboratory requirements CMS has determined are equal
to or more stringent than CLIA’s requirements, and the state licensure program has been
approved by CMS. See id. Two states—New York and Washington—currently meet these con-
ditions. See List of Exempt States Under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments
(CLIA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/ExemptStatesList.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZRX-A7WS].
152. See discussion infra this part.
153. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CMS INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF LABORATORY TESTING UNDER THE CLIA PROGRAM
1 (2006), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/060630
BackgrounderrlEG.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DL8-6WRY].
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indictment of the CLIA regulations to acknowledge that, like all
laws, their protections are tailored to the context for which they
were designed: in this instance, clinical laboratory testing.154 These
same protections may offer fewer benefits as applied in other con-
texts.155 For example, one of CLIA’s most important protections is its
requirement for a laboratory to have a scientifically qualified lab-
oratory director.156 This guards against the possibility that a com-
mercial clinical laboratory might hire a non-scientist business
person to oversee its operations.157 This same protection offers less
incremental benefit in research contexts, where other mecha-
nisms—such as grant sponsors’ close scrutiny of the scientific bona
fides of grant recipients—generally ensure that the person oversee-
ing a research study has relevant scientific knowledge.158
Subjecting research laboratories to the CLIA regulations would
not necessarily advance the goal of ensuring that test results have
clinical quality—that is, that specimens and data are well-identifi-
ed and results have analytic validity, clinical validity, and clinical
utility.159 The CLIA program only addresses analytic validity, but
not clinical validity or utility.160 The analytic validity of tests at a
CLIA-regulated laboratory “is reviewed during its routine biennial
survey—after the laboratory has already started testing.”161 At clin-
ical laboratories that use tests for many years, a biennial validation
ensures that patients tested after the second year a new test is
introduced will receive an analytically validated test.162 At CLIA-
certified research laboratories that use novel tests during short-
term research projects, CLIA’s biennial survey may or may not
154. Cf. id.
155. See id. (describing CLIA’s applicability to clinical settings).
156. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1443.
157. Cf. id. (detailing scientific qualifications required of laboratory directors).
158. See Evans, supra note 6, at 8.
159. See supra notes 88-90.
160. See What Is CMS’s Authority Regarding Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs) and How
Does It Differ from FDA’s Authority?, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 22, 2013),
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/LDT-and-CLIA_
FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P77-ARA4] [hereinafter “What Is CMS’s Authority?”] (“[U]nlike
the FDA regulatory scheme, CMS’ CLIA program does not address the clinical validity of any
test.”).
161. Id.
162. See Evans, supra note 6, at 8.
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happen in time to ensure analytic validity.163 Adding to concerns
about analytic validity, a 2006 report by the United States Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO) documented lax enforcement of
CLIA’s proficiency-testing requirement—the process Congress view-
ed as central to ensuring the analytic validity of laboratory tests.164
Even if CMS vigorously enforced CLIA’s proficiency-testing re-
quirements at CLIA-certified research laboratories, proficiency
testing materials (the well-characterized biospecimens laboratories
purchase in order to conduct their proficiency testing)165 are not
available for many genomic tests, and this is especially true of novel
tests used in research: “For many genetic conditions that are either
rare or for which testing is performed by one or a few laboratories,
substantial challenges in developing formal proficiency testing pro-
grams have been recognized.”166 Subjecting research laboratories to
CLIA regulation thus may not always ensure analytic validity.
CLIA also offers only modest protection against laboratory mix-
ups in which one person’s test samples (biospecimens) or data are
mistaken for another person’s. The CLIA regulation calls for accu-
rate sample and record identification, but its requirements are
modest: 
Laboratories that perform molecular genetic testing for heritable
diseases and conditions should ensure that at least two unique
identifiers are solicited on these test requests, which should
include patient names, when possible, and any other unique
identifiers needed to ensure patient identification. In certain
situations (e.g., compatibility testing for which donor names are
163. See id.
164. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-416, CLINICAL LAB QUALITY: CMS AND
SURVEY OVERSIGHT SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 33 (2006); see also Gabler, supra note 125
(“Even when serious violations are identified, offending labs are rarely sanctioned except in
the most extreme cases. In 2013, just 90 sanctions were issued—accounting for not even 1%
of the 35,000 labs that do high-level lab testing in the United States.”).
165. See Bin Chen et al., Good Laboratory Practices for Molecular Genetic Testing for
Heritable Diseases and Conditions, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., June 12, 2009, at
1, 5.
166. Id.; see also SECY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTING: A RESPONSE TO
THE CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (2008), https://repository.
library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/512822/SACGHS_oversight_report.pdf?se
quence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/L45B-C3HA].
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not always provided to the laboratory), an alternative unique
identifier is appropriate.167
CLIA’s sample-identification requirements are disappointingly min-
imal, and mix-ups occurring at CLIA-regulated clinical laboratories
sometimes have tragic consequences.168 Many non-CLIA-regulated
research laboratories implement sample-identification procedures
that are as stringent as, if not more stringent than, CLIA’s require-
ments.
For all of these reasons, CLIA-compliant facilities—whether they
are clinical or research laboratories—may or may not produce clin-
ical-quality genomic information. GINA draws no distinction be-
tween clinical and subclinical-quality genetic information, between
data generated in research settings and clinical settings, between
data from CLIA or non-CLIA laboratories, or between information
that is correctly or incorrectly attributed to an individual as long as
it purports to be the person’s data.169 This is as it should be because
all such information affects a person’s civil rights.
GINA’s section 105 contains a congressional mandate that genetic
information, as defined by GINA, shall be treated as “health in-
formation” that is protected by the HIPAA Privacy rule.170 Even
167. Chen et al., supra note 165, at 10.
168. See, e.g., Gabler, supra note 125 (detailing mix-up errors at CLIA-regulated lab-
oratories); Gina Kolata, The Lab Says It’s Cancer: But Sometimes the Lab Is Wrong, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/health/the-lab-says-its-cancer-
but-sometimes-the-lab-is-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/A9XJ-6554] (discussing cases of mix-
ups at CLIA labs).
169. See supra note 118 (reciting the broad definition of “genetic information” that GINA’s
§ 102(a)(4) inserted at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(16)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(17) (2012)
(defining “genetic test” as meaning “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins,
or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes” and thus clearly
including non-clinically-significant information, such as raw genomic data, within the scope
of information included in GINA’s definition of “genomic information”); id.§ 300gg-91(d)(18)
(defining “genetic services” as including genetic tests and “genetic counseling (including
obtaining, interpreting, or assessing genetic information)” and genetic information, such that
information from testing, assessing, and counseling occurring during the course of genetic
research is included in GINA’s broad definition of “genetic information”).
170. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 105 (adding a new § 1180
to the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9, providing that “[t]he Secretary shall
revise the HIPAA privacy regulation” so that “[g]enetic information shall be treated as health
information described in [section 1320d(4)(B)] of this title,” which was the section of the Social
Security Act added by the 1996 HIPAA statute in which Congress defined the “health
information” that is subject to HIPAA’s privacy protections); supra note 133.
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though non-clinically-significant genetic information might not be
viewed as health data for other medical and legal purposes (such as
Medicare billing), Congress regards it as “health information” for
purposes of receiving HIPAA’s privacy protections.171 Section 105
also orders HHS to amend its HIPAA regulations to place all genetic
information stored at HIPAA-covered facilities under the HIPAA
protections.172 On December 28, 2000, the day that HHS promul-
gated the original Privacy Rule, the Secretary of HHS delegated
her HIPAA-related responsibilities to the OCR, which oversees civ-
il rights within HHS.173 Section 105 thus was a delegation of rule-
making authority to OCR. GINA requires OCR to consult with other
agencies like the Department of Labor and Department of Treasury,
which have various GINA-related responsibilities,174 but states that
OCR “has the sole authority to promulgate such regulations.”175
Together, GINA’s sections 102 and 105 are a Congressional dele-
gation of authority for OCR to serve as America’s principal regulator
for the protection of genomic civil rights.176
III. GINA’S RELIANCE ON TRANSPARENCY TO PROTECT PRIVACY AND
CIVIL RIGHTS
GINA expressly bans genetic discrimination in two private
spheres—employment and health insurance177—that Congress
clearly can regulate under its commerce power.178 Yet people’s fears
about genetic discrimination extend more broadly to private social
relationships that lie outside the reach of federal regulation: will
a prospective marriage partner reject you over a recessive variant
171. See § 105.
172. Id. 
173. Statement of Delegation of Authority, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,381 (Dec. 28, 2000); see also
About Us, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. C.R., https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/about-us/
index.html [https://perma.cc/YM54-AA9D].
174. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 § 105(b); see also The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008: “GINA,” U.S. DEP’T LAB.: C.R. CTR., https://www.
dol.gov/oasam/programs/crc/finalGINAguidance.htm [https://perma.cc/AV6X-5362].
175. § 105(b)(1).
176. See §§ 102, 105.
177. See Roberts, supra note 3, at 441.
178. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce
with Foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); see also
Roberts, supra note 3, at 484-87.
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for offensive body odor, a clinically insignificant but undesirable
trait that rational suitors may not wish to bestow on their offspring?
The federal government cannot force your lover to marry you in
spite of the variant. All it can do is arm people with information
that empowers them to negotiate their own, private solutions. GINA
embraced this approach to the broader problem of private genetic
discrimination.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule already included an individual access
right on the day Congress enacted GINA.179 By placing genetic in-
formation under the Privacy Rule,180 Congress seemingly intended
to grant Americans a right of access to their own genetic informa-
tion stored at HIPAA-regulated facilities.181 A major challenge in
fighting genetic discrimination is that people may never realize they
belong to a genetic subclass that is being targeted for discrimina-
tion, making it hard to organize resistance to the discrimination.
Invidious discrimination based on classifications like gender, sexual
preference, race, or national origin is easier for its victims to detect,
because people generally know they fall into, or could be perceived
as falling into, those classes. Yet who among us knows whether we
carry a particular genetic variant that may cause other people—not
just employers and insurers, but neighbors and friends—to turn
against us? 
People can discriminate against us based on our genetic variants
only if the people know we possess those variants. For this reason,
when our genetic information is stored anywhere, we need privacy
protections that limit others’ access to it. Less obvious is the fact
that we also need access to the data ourselves, because access to our
own data empowers us to detect and address genetic discrimination
if it is leveled at us. Individual data access challenges the assertion
that good policy will emerge if people are kept behind a Rawlsian
“veil of ignorance”182 so that none of us knows which gene variants
we possess and, therefore, none of us knows which forms of genetic
discrimination potentially affect us.183 A foundational assumption
179. Evans, supra note 6, at 6; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018).
180. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
181. Evans, supra note 6, at 6.
182. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
183. Id. at 136-37 (“[Under the veil of ignorance, people] do not know how the various al-
ternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles
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of genomic civil rights is that good policies can emerge only from a
smart, informed population whose members know where their inter-
ests lie. The insistent civil rights assertion of Moses’s “[l]et my peo-
ple go[!]”184 translates in the genomic era to “let my people have
their data!”
Data privacy is often theorized as a condition in which individuals
exercise full control over their own data and who has access to it.185
GINA did not, by placing genetic information under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, grant people this brand of privacy. One way to protect
genomic civil rights would have been to impose a strong consent
regime that gave people ironclad control over all uses and disclo-
sures of their genetic information, including control over any
downstream redisclosures of their data.186 Then, individuals could
protect their own civil rights by restricting access to their data.187
The Privacy Rule never embraced this approach.188 It states a
default rule that individuals can control access to their data by sign-
ing or refusing to sign “authorizations” (HIPAA’s name for con-
sents),189 but it enumerates a long list of exceptions to this default
rule.190
The Privacy Rule is widely—and unfairly—criticized for having
broken its promise of privacy by allowing people’s data to be shared
solely on the basis of general considerations.”).
184. Exodus 9:1.
185. See, e.g., Deborah C. Peel, Written Testimony Before the HIT Policy Committee, ELEC-
TRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Sept. 18, 2009), http://epic.org/privacy/medical/Peel_PPR%20
Written%20testimony%20HIT%20Policy%20Committee.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q34X-GQZR]
(framing privacy as “control of personal information” and “consumer control over [personal
health information]”); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 815, 820 (2000) (noting that individual control over one’s data, rather than secrecy of the
data, is key to the modern paradigm of data privacy).
186. Evans, supra note 63.
187. See id.; Evans, supra note 6, at 8.
188. See infra this Part. 
189. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2018).
190. See id.; Letter from William W. Stead, Chair, Nat’l Comm. Vital & Health Statistics,
to Honorable Sylvia M. Burwell, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. app.A at 15-
19 (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/2016-Ltr-Privacy-
Minimum-Necessary-formatted-on-ltrhead-Nov-9-FINAL-w-sig.pdf [https://perma.cc/ J7DF-
X9VP] (listing various provisions allowing unconsented disclosure and use of data); see also
Barbara J. Evans & Gail P. Jarvik, Impact of HIPAA’s Minimum Necessary Standard on
Genomic Data Sharing, 20 GENETICS MED. 531, 531-35 (2018) (discussing nonconsensual data
sharing under HIPAA).
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and used, in many instances, without their consent.191 In reality, the
Privacy Rule never made such a promise. It was designed, from its
inception, to serve competing values of privacy and data transpar-
ency, giving considerable weight to the latter.
The 1996 HIPAA statute charged HHS with preparing recommen-
dations on health data privacy and submitting them to Congress by
1997.192 The statute envisioned that Congress would separately en-
act a national health privacy statute based on these recommenda-
tions.193 The HIPAA statute contained a springing authority for
HHS to promulgate the Privacy Rule if Congress had not enacted
privacy legislation by August 21, 1999.194 After reviewing HHS’s
recommendations,195 Congress chose to let HHS proceed with rule-
making—a signal that Congress endorsed the main contours of the
1997 recommendations.196 Those recommendations unabashedly
embraced the view that transparent sharing of health data offers
societal benefits that, in some circumstances, outweigh individuals’
desire to control access to their data:
A Federal health privacy law should permit limited disclosures
of health information without patient consent for specifically
identified national priority activities. We have carefully exam-
ined the many uses that the health professions, related indus-
tries, and the government make of health information, and we
are aware of the concerns of privacy and consumer advocates
about these uses. The allowable disclosures and corresponding
restrictions we recommend reflect a balancing of privacy and
other social values.197
191. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010) (criticizing the Privacy Rule).
192. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 264(a)-(b), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033.
193. Id. § 264(c).
194. Id.
195. Confidentiality of Individually Identifiable Health Information: Recommendations
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Pursuant to Section 264 of the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. § I.I (Sept.
11, 1997) [hereinafter HHS Recommendations], https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/confidentiality-
individually-identifiable-health-information [https://perma.cc/M9TK-YZQW].
196. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF
THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1-2 (2003), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.
pdf?language=es [https://perma.cc/G8KE-4DLK].
197. HHS Recommendations, supra note 195, § I.I.
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In addition to disclosures to support medical treatment and
healthcare payments, these national priority activities include:
(1) supplying data to support regulatory oversight of the healthcare
system; (2) allowing access to data for public health activities;
(3) supplying data for health research; and (4) supporting data flows
authorized by other laws and court orders for law enforcement,
court proceedings, and various state governmental purposes.198
Under the Privacy Rule, individuals have no right to block uses or
disclosures of their data for these activities, and alternative, lesser
privacy protections apply.199
The Privacy Rule’s national priority activities map onto categories
of transparency that Frederick Schauer once identified.200 In
Schauer’s scheme, “[t]ransparency as regulation” empowers the
recipient of information to regulate, monitor, or control the informa-
tion provider.201 This concept is exemplified by FDA’s proposal to
rely on large genomic databases, populated with data shared by
genome testing laboratories, to infer whether their tests have clin-
ical validity.202 Schauer’s second concept, “[t]ransparency as [e]f-
ficiency,” treats data flows as instrumental to efficient markets203
and corresponds to the Privacy Rule’s provisions allowing data to
flow freely to support treatment and healthcare payment activ-
ities.204 Schauer’s third concept, “[t]ransparency as [e]pistemology,”
describes data flows that sustain the creation of nonmarket and
public goods,205 such as scientific discovery, public health, or the
capacity of law enforcement agencies and courts to get at the
198. Id.; see also I. Glenn Cohen, Is There a Duty to Share Healthcare Data?, in BIG DATA,
HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 209, 209-22 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018) (discussing the role
of data sharing in fostering scientific discovery).
199. See Letter from William W. Stead to Honorable Sylvia M. Burwell, supra note 190,
app. A at 15-17 tbl.1 (summarizing the protections available under the Privacy Rule in
situations where data are used without the individual’s authorization); Evans & Jarvik, supra
note 190.
200. Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339,
1347-50.
201. Id. at 1347-48.
202. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 121
(proposing to leverage genetic databases to evaluate clinical performance of genomic tests).
203. Schauer, supra note 200, at 1350.
204. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a)-(c) (2018).
205. Schauer, supra note 200, at 1350.
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truth.206 These three concepts portray unconsented data flows as
conferring broad benefits on society as a whole.207 Individuals whose
data are shared for the sake of transparency may reap some of these
benefits, but many of the benefits presumably flow to others, setting
up a potential conflict between privacy and transparency. 
Relevant to this conflict, Schauer identified a fourth, and final
concept, “[t]ransparency as [d]emocracy,” which describes the shar-
ing of data with members of the public to enable the governed to
monitor and manage their government.208 By this view, individuals’
access to data promotes better governmental decisions by subjecting
the government to oversight “by the people,” and, more deeply, it
displays respect for public control as an end in itself.209 In health-
care settings, the phrase “[t]ransparency as [d]emocracy” is inap-
posite: the healthcare system is in a power relationship—but not
governance relationship—with patients and research participants.
The term “transparency as respect for autonomy” is more appropri-
ate. The values served by Schauer’s fourth concept of transparency
closely resemble the modern bioethical values of respect for au-
tonomy, respect for persons, and informed consent210 which promote
accountability of healthcare providers to individuals, address im-
balances of power between patients and medically trained person-
nel, and foster patient empowerment as an end in itself.211
The Privacy Rule gives special weight to this fourth type of trans-
parency,212 granting individuals a legally enforceable right to inspect
and receive copies of data that HIPAA-regulated entities store about
them.213 A former HHS Secretary once characterized this right as
206. See generally BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED
RESOURCES 61-90 (2012) (describing the role of infrastructure, including data infrastructure,
in creating public and nonmarket goods).
207. See generally Schauer, supra note 200.
208. Id. at 1349. 
209. See id.
210. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT:
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH
pt. B (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-
belmont-report-508c_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/99VW-5ZN6] (listing “respect for persons”
as the first of three “basic ethical principles”).
211. Evans, supra note 63, at 32-33.
212. Id. at 33.
213. See HHS Recommendations, supra note 195, § II.C.2 (calling for an individual access
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the “cornerstone of the [HIPAA] Privacy Rule.”214 Individual data
access is the cornerstone, I argue, because—dating back to the dawn
of the information age in the early 1970s—the U.S. federal gov-
ernment has embraced this form of transparency as its response to
the central dilemma of privacy regulation. Individuals have strong
claims for their sensitive data to remain strictly private and subject
to their own control.215 However, honoring those claims would inflict
unacceptable costs to society because transparency fosters effective
regulation, economic efficiency, and the creation of diverse public
goods.216 Transparency in service of these goals undeniably poses
risks to individuals’ civil rights. U.S. federal law embraces a daring
and somewhat counterintuitive approach to this dilemma: perhaps
the way to address transparency’s risk to individual rights is to
provide even more transparency, in this case, in the form of trans-
parency as respect for autonomy.217 Empowered by access to their
own data, individuals can identify forms of discrimination and
stigmatization to which they may be susceptible.218 Armed with this
knowledge, they can exercise various other federally protected civil
rights, including their First Amendment protected rights to as-
semble and petition the government for redress of grievances.219 
Embracing this approach, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970
granted people a right to obtain all the information about them-
selves stored by consumer credit-reporting agencies.220 In the sphere
right in recommendations that the HIPAA statute required HHS to provide to Congress in
1997); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018) (implementing this right).
214. See HHS Announces New Rule that Gives Patients Direct Access to Lab Test Results,
CAL. PHYSICIAN’S LEGAL HANDBOOK: NEWS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://cplh.org/blog/detail/?article=
hhs-announces-new-rule-that-gives-patients [https://perma.cc/N4N3-QRGF] (alteration in
original) (quoting then-HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius).
215. See, e.g., Sandra Park, Who Should Control Your Genetic Information—You or Cor-
porate Laboratories?, ACLU BLOG (May 19, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/medical-and-genetic-privacy/who-should-control-your-genetic-information-you
[https://perma.cc/VXX7-TWW9] (discussing cancer patients’ interests in accessing their ge-
netic information both to aid their family members and to be able to contribute the data to re-
search).
216. See supra this Part; see also Schauer, supra note 200, at 1347-50.
217. See infra Part IV.A.
218. See infra Part IV.C.
219. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting “the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”); infra Part IV.D.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2) (2012); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, A SUMMARY OF YOUR
RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-
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of health care, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Sys-
tems developed a Code of Fair Information Practices in 1973 that
stressed, “[t]here must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.”221 The
Privacy Act of 1974, which governs the privacy of federal health
record systems like CMS’s Medicare databases, incorporated this
recommendation, enabling access to government-held health data.222
Before the Privacy Act, individuals sometimes invoked the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain access to their own data,223 but
FOIA requests were cumbersome and often yielded incomplete
access.224 The Privacy Act’s more streamlined access right later be-
came the model for HIPAA’s access right.225
The Privacy Act contains congressional findings that data pri-
vacy is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution226 and
that an individual right to inspect and obtain one’s own data is
necessary and proper to protect this privacy right.227 These state-
ments are enacted congressional findings of fact: findings that
0096-fair-credit-reporting-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS6J-JYC5].
221. SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41 (1973), https://
www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/LLS9-28EF] (announcing an
influential Code of Fair Information Practices (FIPs) based on five principles); see also Fred
H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
AGE OF THE “INFORMATION ECONOMY” 341, 346 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (tracing subsequent
development of FIPs, including access rights, after the 1973 HEW Code of FIPs); HHS Rec-
ommendations, supra note 195, § II.C.2 (referring to this principle from the 1973 HEW Code
of FIPs in the roadmap for the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
222. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a), (d) (2012), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. III 2016).
223. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 2018).
224. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 508
(1977). 
225. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.
Reg. 59,918, 59,980-82 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-64) (ex-
plaining, in the preamble to the originally proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule, that HIPAA’s access
right was modeled on the similar provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974). 
226. See Privacy Act of 1974 § 2(a), 5 U.S.C. § 552a note (“The Congress finds that ... the
right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States, and ... it is necessary and proper for the Congress to regulate the collection, main-
tenance, use, and dissemination of information.”).
227.  Id. § 2(b)(3) (including, as a core element of data privacy protection, safeguards that
“permit an individual to gain access to information pertaining to him ..., to have a copy made
of all or any portion thereof, and to correct or amend such record”).
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received majority votes in both houses of Congress and were sign-
ed into law by President Gerald Ford and then recorded in the U.S.
Code.228 Enacted congressional findings of legal fact such as these
are not binding on the courts, but courts do pay some attention to
them and tend to give more weight to congressional findings that
expand individual rights, as these do, than to those that reduce
people’s rights.229 The Privacy Act codifies the principle that access
to one’s own data is necessary to enable the exercise of fundamental
rights.
In the Privacy Act, Congress also established a Privacy Protection
Study Commission (PPSC),230 which issued an influential 1977
report supporting individual access to medical data held by nongov-
ernmental healthcare providers, insurers, and other organiza-
tions.231 Private-sector entities are not covered by the 1974 Privacy
Act and thus are not subject to its access right,232 nor are they
subject to FOIA.233 The United States relies heavily on private-
sector healthcare providers and payers,234 so individual health data
access would never be effective without a right of access to privately
stored health records. The opportunity to create such a right arose
twenty years later, after passage of the HIPAA statute in 1996.235
The PPSC’s 1977 report recognized that there are compelling rea-
sons to share people’s data, under certain circumstances, without
228. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a note (codifying these findings). See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008) (pointing out
that Congressional findings of fact can include facts about the law); William D. Araiza,
Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (2013) (discussing enacted congressional findings of fact and the degree
of deference courts accord to them).
229. See sources cited supra note 228.
230. See Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974: Role of the Privacy Protection Commission,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 16, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opcl/role-privacy-protection-study-
commission [https://perma.cc/S39C-QG85].
231. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 224, ch. 7.
232. 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
233. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
234. See Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia Cox, Kaiser Family Found., How Does Health Spend-
ing in the U.S. Compare to Other Countries?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Feb.
13, 2018), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-compare-
countries/#item-u-s-increased-public-private-sector-spending-faster-rate-similar-countries
[https://perma.cc/Z6ZR-PFGR].
235. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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their consent.236 The PPSC cautioned, however, that if a person’s da-
ta—including their research records—cannot be “totally protected
against the possibility that individually identifiable information in
them will be disclosed for any other purpose, the individual’s con-
cern is obvious and his access right highly relevant.”237 By this view,
individual access is ethically justified not merely because it is in-
strumental to better clinical health care. It is ethically necessary as
a means of protecting people’s civil rights in contexts where people’s
data privacy is imperfectly protected—which is to say, in virtually
all healthcare and biomedical research contexts.238
IV. TRANSPARENCY AS A TOOL OF CIVIL RIGHTS
HIPAA’s individual access right serves several stated regulatory
objectives. The HHS and its component agencies such as CMS and
OCR announced these purposes in various rulemakings creating or
amending HIPAA’s access right and in subsequent regulatory guid-
ance documents.239 Some of the purposes clearly relate to clinical
data, rather than research data. For example, helping patients un-
derstand their health status and treatment options240 and helping
patients detect instances of misdiagnosis and medical malpractice241
are pertinent to tests done in the clinical treatment setting. The
remaining regulatory objectives, discussed below, are equally rele-
vant to clinical and research data.
236. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 224, at 281 (observing “how heavily a vari-
ety of institutions in our society have come to depend on the information in medical records
in order to perform their basic functions”).
237. Id. at 597.
238. See infra Part VII.B.; see also Gina Kolata, Poking Holes in Genetic Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES: NEWS ANALYSIS (June 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/science/poking-
holes-in-the-privacy-of-dna.html [https://perma.cc/M7WP-W9PN] (discussing problems with
the privacy, security, and reidentifiability of stored genetic information).
239. See infra Part IV.A-D.
240. See, e.g., CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports,
79 Fed. Reg. 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164) (not-
ing, in the preamble to final rule on laboratory data access, that barriers to individual data
access “prevent[ ] patients from having a more active role in their personal health care de-
cisions”).
241. See id. at 7293 (citing statistics that clinicians fail to inform patients of abnormal test
results 7 percent of the time).
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A. Ensuring Respect for Individual Autonomy
The primary purpose of HIPAA’s access right is to force entities
that store individually identifiable data to display respect for the
individuals’ autonomy. The preamble to the original Privacy Rule
cites a “well-established principle” that an individual should have
“access rights to the data and information in his or her health record
and other health information databases.”242
The 1979 Belmont Report—a foundational document in American
bioethics—declared that “individuals should be treated as autono-
mous agents.”243 Legal standards of that decade, such as the 1974
Privacy Act and the 1973 Code of Fair Information Practices,244
treated access to one’s own information as an obvious appurtenance
of autonomy.245 Subsequent theorizations divorced the concept of
individual autonomy from the right of access to information about
oneself.246 My research could not conclusively pinpoint when this
shift occurred and others are invited to add their insights.
The Belmont Report’s 1979 declaration of individual autonomy
was hedged with a proviso that “persons with diminished autonomy
are entitled to protection.”247 This proviso, however, seemed to en-
vision a rare exception to protect prisoners, children, and others
whose circumstances or decisional incompetence make it hard to
exercise autonomy.248 There was no suggestion, in the Belmont Re-
port, that all research participants have diminished autonomy.249
At some point between 1979 and now, this proviso swallowed
the rule that most people are entitled to be treated as autono-
mous, at least where data access is concerned. A recurring theme
242. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,606 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
243. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 210, pt. B (listing “respect for persons” as the first of
three “Basic Ethical Principles”).
244. See supra Part III.
245. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 122 (listing various recent scholarly works that have maintained that
individuals’ access to their own data should be subject to various restrictions, such as limiting
return of results to information that has analytic validity, clinical validity and/or clinical
utility).
247. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 210, pt. B. 
248. See id.
249. See id.
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in post-1990 ESLI studies is that genetic information is so complex
that all who are not medically trained have diminished autonomy
and need special protections when confronted with it.250 These con-
cerns are most intense with respect to one discrete class of individ-
uals—research participants undergoing genomic testing in research
laboratories—because research data may be unreliable and lay-
people may fail to appreciate the unreliability.251 Laypeople may
suffer anxiety or psychological distress.252 They may pursue harm-
ful medical treatments to mitigate misunderstood genetic risks.253
They may waste scarce research and healthcare resources asking
follow-up questions and seeking follow-up medical evaluations.254
They may make bad choices that harm themselves and society.255
While there is a diversity of bioethical views on this matter, a
fairly broad consensus of bioethical opinion favors restricting peo-
ple’s access to their own genomic data.256 Research regulators257 call
250. See, e.g., NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 71-72.
251. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (listing a number of scholarly works that
have expressed concerns about broad, unrestricted access by individuals to information about
themselves generated during the course of research).
252. See NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 122, at 71 (noting the existence
of these concerns); Maschke, supra note 122, at 563 (same); Lisa S. Parker, Returning
Individual Research Results: What Role Should People’s Preferences Play?, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 449, 470 (2012) (same); Sharon F. Terry, The Tension Between Policy and Practice
in Returning Research Results and Incidental Findings in Genomic Biobank Research, 13
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 691, 713 (2012) (same).
253. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 121
(noting that uncertain or inaccurate genomic tests “can lead to patients receiving the wrong
diagnosis, the wrong treatment or no treatment at all even when effective therapy is
available” (internal citations omitted)).
254. See Thomas M. Morgan, Genomic Screening: The Mutation and the Mustard Seed, 46
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 541, 544 (2018) (discussing the workload involved when individuals turn
to their physicians to seek clarification of low-quality or unconfirmed genetic findings).
255. See, e.g., Holman & Taylor, supra note 122, at 687 (noting these concerns, without
necessarily agreeing that they are sufficient grounds to restrict individuals’ access to their
own genetic information).
256. See supra note 122 (citing examples of scholar works that recommend various
restrictions on individuals’ access to research data about themselves).
257. See, e.g., Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512,
44,514-15 (advance notice of proposed rulemaking provided July 26, 2011) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164 and 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56) (proposing that an Institutional Review
Board (IRB) review is necessary in research where results will be returned to participants,
even if the research is otherwise low-risk biospecimen research that would be excused from
IRB review).
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for ethics review bodies to filter genetic information before it is
shared with research participants to assess “what information can
be effectively communicated in a manner sensitive to [research]
subjects’ health literacy.”258 “Participant literacy, or lack thereof,
causes a great deal of tension in the system.”259 In a discussion pa-
per, the U.S. National Academy of Medicine (formerly the Institute
of Medicine) notes that “analyses of health literacy indicate that, on
average, US adults have limited health literacy.”260 The academy
has published too many papers over the past thirty years with
“health literacy” in the title to cite them all here.261
In some strands of modern ELSI scholarship, health illiteracy
is seen as diminishing individuals’ autonomy in a way that dis-
qualifies their right of access to their own data. Forty years ago, the
Belmont Report conceived autonomy as the capacity of self-de-
termining people to make their own decisions;262 there was no re-
quirement that they must make good decisions.263 To borrow
Frederick Schauer’s remark about democracy: “[Autonomy], after
all, is not about the people necessarily being right, but about the
258. Holman & Taylor, supra note 122, at 672-73 (quoting Isaac S. Kohane et al.,
Reestablishing the Researcher-Patient Compact, 316 SCI. 836, 837 (2007)).
259. Terry, supra note 252, at 709.
260. Kim Parson et al., Health Literacy Insights for Health Crises 1-2 (Nat’l Acad. of Med.,
Discussion Paper, 2017), https://nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Health-Literacy-
Insights-for-Health-Crises.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EW6-QVA7].
261. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he results of the 1992, 2003, and 2011 surveys of adult literacy in
the United States indicate that literacy skills—reading, writing, speaking, listening, calcu-
lating, problem solving, and use of technology—are indeed quite problematic for a large pro-
portion of adults. Furthermore, analyses of health literacy indicate that, on average, US
adults have limited health literacy.”); see also NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIS. ENG’G & MED.,
HEALTH INSURANCE AND INSIGHTS FROM HEALTH LITERACY: HELPING CONSUMERS UNDER-
STAND: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP IN BRIEF (2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24613/
health-insurance-and-insights-from-health-literacy-helping-consumers-understand [https://
perma.cc/NDS4-C54N]; NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIS. ENG’G & MED., RELEVANCE OF HEALTH
LITERACY TO PRECISION MEDICINE: WORKSHOP IN BRIEF (2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/
23538/relevance-of-health-literacy-to-precision-medicine-workshop-in-brief [https://perma.cc/
VA7A-HUPJ]; Andrew Pleasant et al., Considerations for a New Definition of Health Literacy
(Nat’l Acad. of Med., Discussion Paper, 2016), http://nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/
Considerations-for-a-New-Definition-of-Health-Literacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ3C-4GY2];
Bhavna Sivanand et al., Building Health Literacy and Family Engagement in Head Start
Communities: A Case Study (Nat’l Acad. of Med., Discussion Paper, 2017), https://nam.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Building-Health-Literacy-and-Family-Engagement-in-Head-
Start-Communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW3R-AM46].
262. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 210, pt. B.
263. Cf. id.
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right of people to be wrong.”264 At some point over the past four de-
cades, a more paternalistic view gained ground.265
GINA, and the access right it created, reinstated two long-
standing principles of U.S. federal law and Belmont-era bioethics:
(1) individuals—even those whom an entrenched elite disparages
as illiterate—are autonomous individuals,266 and (2) autonomy
implies certain basic civil rights, including a right of access to
one’s own genetic information.267
B. Strengthening Privacy Protections
When first proposing HIPAA’s access right in 1999, HHS noted
that “[w]hile the right to have access to one’s information may ap-
pear somewhat different from the right to keep information private,
these two policy goals have always been closely tied”268 and the right
to inspect and copy one’s data “is a fundamental aspect of protecting
privacy.”269 The Privacy Rule’s preamble notes that individuals’ con-
fidence in the protection of their information requires that they have
the means to know what is contained in their records.270
The existence of stored data contributes to a person’s reidentifi-
cation risk: the risk that data held in anonymous form elsewhere
might be reidentified via cross-correlation with the stored dataset.271
264. Schauer, supra note 200, at 1349.
265. Cf. id. at 1353-54.
266. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 210, pt. B.
267. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. III 2016)
(providing an individual access right to individually identifiable information held in govern-
mental databases, including genetic information if it is stored with identifiers).
268. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,918, 59,980 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
269. Id.
270. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 82,606 (citing NAT’L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE & THE JOINT COMM’N ON ACCRED-
ITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., PROTECTING PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION: A FRAMEWORK
FOR MEETING THE CHALLENGES IN A MANAGED CARE ENVIRONMENT 25 (1998)).
271. See Letter from William W. Stead, Chair, Nat’l Comm. Vital & Health Statistics, to
Honorable Thomas E. Price, Secretary, Dep’t Health & Human Servs. 5 (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/2017-Ctr-Privacy-DeIdentification-
Feb-230Final-w-sig-pdg [https://perma.cc/C7EF-AQMB] (“Even data properly de-identified
under the Privacy Rule may carry with it some private information, and, therefore, poses
some risk of re-identification, a risk that grows into the future as new datasets are released
and as datasets are combined.”).
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In an age when reidentification is a growing privacy threat, people
need access to all of their stored genetic data, including data from
non-CLIA-regulated research laboratories, in order to understand
their privacy risks.272 Even if a laboratory that stores genetic infor-
mation does not share it, its files may be hacked and, when cor-
related with external data sets, become a tool for reidentifying
people’s data held in deidentified form elsewhere.273
The National Committee for Vital and Health Statistics, which
advises on HIPAA issues,274 recently noted that HIPAA-covered
laboratories that store data in identifiable form can release it to
others without individual consent if they first deidentify it according
to HIPAA’s rather lax deidentification standards.275 The laboratory
has no duty to provide the individual with an accounting for dis-
closures of deidentified data,276 which have “expanded exponential-
ly” in recent years.277 The Common Rule also allows research data
to be disclosed in deidentified form without consent.278 If a research
laboratory releases a person’s deidentified data to a non-HIPAA-
covered entity, the information will no longer be subject to HIPAA’s
privacy protections even if it is subsequently reidentified, which is
increasingly done in order to assemble integrated, longitudinal data-
bases.279 A non-HIPAA-covered data aggregator, analytics company,
or health applications business that receives and reidentifies a per-
son’s data is free—at least as far is HIPAA is concerned—to redis-
close it in fully identified form.280 The whole world potentially has
272. See Kolata, supra note 238 (providing examples in which genetic information was
successfully reidentified); see also Daniel Barth-Jones, The Debate Over ‘Re-Identification’ of
Health Information: What Do We Risk?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012) (discussing
reidentifiability of health information more generally), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.
1377/hblog20120810.021952/full/ [https://perma.cc/DW9V-YTRR].
273. See Letter from William W. Stead to Honorable Thomas E. Price, supra note 271, at
5.
274. See About, NAT’L COMM. FOR VITAL HEALTH STATISTICS, https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/about/
[https://perma.cc/PZR3-6KJ9].
275. See Letter from William W. Stead to Honorable Thomas E. Price, supra note 271, at
5.
276. See id. at 7.
277. Id. at 5.
278. 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. A.
279. See Letter from William W. Stead to Honorable Thomas E. Price, supra note 271, at
9-10.
280. See id. at 5.
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access to your fully identified research-quality genomic data, yet
safety regulators and many bioethicists feel you should not have
it.281 GINA took the position that, at least as far as your genetic
information is concerned, you deserve access, too. 
C. Protecting Civil Rights in the Face of Incomplete Privacy
Protections
From the outset, the HIPAA statute was an imperfect vehicle for
protecting people’s health data privacy. HIPAA was primarily an
insurance statute.282 HIPAA’s Administrative Simplification pro-
visions283 authorized HHS to regulate the electronic exchange of
information to support payments and administrative transactions
among healthcare providers, payers, and healthcare clearinghouses
that transmit information electronically when conducting such
transactions.284 HHS’s regulatory authority under the HIPAA stat-
ute extended only to these entities (the so-called “HIPAA-covered
entities”), which are involved in the payment chain for healthcare
services.285 Privacy was just one aspect of these regulations.286
HIPAA gave HHS no jurisdiction to regulate the multitude of other
private companies and institutions (for example, drug manufactur-
ers, research institutions that provide no healthcare services, com-
panies that sell fitness-tracking devices, direct-to-consumer genetic
testing services, and many others) that use and store people’s health
data in ways that affect their privacy.287
281. See supra note 122 (citing bioethical studies that have recommended various restric-
tions on individuals’ access to research results); see also Part VII.A.2 (discussing statements
by CMS that have had the effect of impeding individuals’ HIPAA right of access to data from
non-CLIA-compliant research laboratories).
282. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
pmbl., 110 Stat. 1936, 1936.
283. See id. §§ 261-264 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d to § 1320d-8 (2012)) (enacting a new
part C of title IX of the Social Security Act). 
284. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,918, 59,920 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
285. See supra note 49.
286. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 59,920-21 (noting that HIPAA’s privacy regulations are part of a package of
regulations addressing the electronic interchange of health information more broadly).
287. Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (defining the entities to which the HIPAA regulations apply
and not including drug manufacturers, fitness device manufacturers, and many other entities
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Congress knew that the HIPAA statute had not granted HHS the
jurisdiction it really needed to be an effective health privacy regu-
lator.288 For this reason, HIPAA envisioned that Congress would
enact follow-on privacy legislation by August 21, 1999.289 HHS
would gain authority to promulgate the HIPAA Privacy Rule only
if Congress failed to legislate.290
Congress’s self-imposed deadline passed, and it fell to HHS to try
to regulate using the inadequate powers HIPAA had granted. HHS
reluctantly proposed a draft Privacy Rule in 1999.291 In the pream-
ble, HHS exhorted Congress to pass legislation and expressed
frustration that 
the proposed regulation does not directly cover many of the
persons who obtain identifiable health information from the
covered entities.... [W]e are, therefore, faced with creating new
regulatory permissions for covered entities to disclose health
information, but cannot directly put in place appropriate re-
strictions on how many likely recipients may use and re-disclose
such information.292
HHS seriously considered “limiting the type or scope of disclosures
permitted” but felt forced to allow wide data sharing to promote “key
public goals such as research, public health, and law enforce-
ment.”293
The PPSC’s 1977 recommendations found an ethical duty to pro-
vide individual access if privacy protections are too weak to protect
against unconsented disclosures of people’s data.294 Aware that the
Privacy Rule was weak and would not protect people against
unconsented disclosures of their data,295 HHS followed the PPSC’s
that use and handle healthcare data).
288. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 59, 923.
289. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-91,
§ 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1930, 2033.
290. Id.
291. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 59,923-24.
292. Id. at 59,923.
293. Id.
294. See supra notes 230-38 and accompanying text. 
295. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.
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recommendation to include an individual access right.296 Access is
a second-best solution that empowers people to assess the risks to
their civil rights so that they can protect their rights as best they
can when privacy law fails to do so.
D. Enabling Other Federal Civil Rights
For the vast majority of variants that genomic testing reveals, the
clinical validity and utility are unknown.297 Such data lack clinical
significance but are relevant to civil rights.298 In addition to em-
powering individuals to detect instances of genetic discrimination,299
data access enables the exercise of various other federally protected
civil rights, including people’s First Amendment rights to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.300
Precision medicine scholar Matt Might has published “how-to”
instructions for assembling social networks of people who share
genetic variants associated with rare diseases.301 Sharon Terry,
President and CEO of the Genetic Alliance, agrees that access to
genetic test information fosters formation of social networks among
people who share particular gene variants.302 This right of assembly
has its greatest significance precisely in the circumstance when a
person has a variant of unknown clinical significance.303 Professor
Might recounts a compelling story of having a son with a suspected
deleterious variant that scientists had never seen before.304 He used
social networking to assemble a group of other people with that
same variant, which enabled researchers to clarify the variant’s
Reg. at 59,923-24 (discussing the weaknesses of the proposed Privacy Rule).
296. See id. at 59,923.
297. See Dewey et al., supra note 18.
298. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Part III. 
300. U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting “the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”).
301. See Matt Might, Discovering New Diseases with the Internet: How to Find a Match-
ing Patient, MATT MIGHT, http://matt.might.net/articles/rare-disease-internet-matchmaking/
[https://perma.cc/2GSS-SSZV].
302. See Terry, supra note 252, at 714-15. 
303. See The White House, White House Precision Medicine Initiative Summit, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3AMq759psUM&feature=youtu.be&t=1h
2m36s [https://perma.cc/3H46-UAB9] (presentation of Matt Might).
304. See id.
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significance.305 Groups with a variant of unknown significance also
can petition Congress and research funding agencies, such as the
NIH, to direct more funding toward clarifying the significance of
their variant.306 These activities are expressly protected by the First
Amendment,307 and policies that limit people’s genomic data access
potentially deprive them of federally protected civil rights.
People have civil rights to engage in scientific inquiry themselves
and to contribute their data for research by others. OCR noted, in
a 2016 guidance document, that HIPAA’s access right makes it
possible for people to “directly contribute their information to re-
search.”308 People wishing to contribute their stored data for use in
research often find that the data holder will not cooperate in re-
leasing their data, and HIPAA’s access right empowers individuals
to free their data from recalcitrant data-holders for research pur-
poses.309 Citizen-led groups, empowered by access to their own data,
can attract researchers to study their condition.310 There is also a
growing citizen-science movement, and data access fosters this
activity.311 Policies by research funding agencies and professional
305. See id.
306. See Terry, supra note 252, at 714; see also REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS
SALVATION: PATIENT ADVOCACY & RESEARCH ETHICS 5 (2001) (“Today, more than ever, bio-
medical research is a public affair.... A new breed of patient advocate sits at the table with
scientists and policymakers, setting research agendas, planning studies, and considering how
study results should affect clinical practice.”). 
307. U.S. CONST. amend I.
308. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INDIVIDUALS’
RIGHT UNDER HIPAA TO ACCESS THEIR HEALTH INFORMATION 45 CFR § 164.524 (Feb. 25,
2016) [hereinafter OCR, 2016 ACCESS GUIDANCE], https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
privacy/guidance/access/index.html [https://perma.cc/N9YT-3DXU]. 
309. See Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the Gate: Consumer-Driven Health Data Com-
mons and the Transformation of Citizen Science, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 651, 672-73 (2016). 
310. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (discussing an effort by families affected by Canavan disease to
assemble data and biospecimen resources to fuel research); see also PCORnet PPRN Con-
sortium, Patient-Powered Research Networks: Building Capacity for Conducting Patient-
Centered Clinical Outcomes Research, 21 J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC. 583, 583-86 (2014),
https://academic.oup.com/jamia/article/21/4/583/2909240 [https://perma.cc/QQG5-4956] (dis-
cussing assembly of data resources by groups of individuals empowered by access to their
data); Sharon F. Terry, The Study Is Open: Participants Are Recruiting Investigators, SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. (Jan. 4, 2017), http://stm.sciencemag.org/content/9/371/eaaf1001.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YLB8-UMSG]. 
311. See generally Evans, supra note 6 (discussing HIPAA’s access right as a tool to enable
citizen science); Michael J. Madison, Commons at the Intersection of Peer Production, Citizen
Science, and Big Data: Galaxy Zoo, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 209, 215 (Brett M.
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scientists that block individual data access may reflect a judgment
that citizen science is illegitimate, yet people have a right of scien-
tific inquiry that potentially enjoys constitutional protection.312 
Beyond citizen science, some people also desire a new citizen-led
bioethics: a framework of data citizenship that gives them a mean-
ingful voice in setting the privacy and data security standards that
will govern research uses of their data.313 The earlier discussion of
risks of reidentification and redisclosure of deidentified data sheds
light on why many people are disenchanted with the top-down,
expert-led “protections” that bioethicists and regulators have fash-
ioned for them.314 HIPAA access helps foster data citizenship.315
E. Additional Non-Civil-Rights Objectives
The remaining objectives of HIPAA’s access right sound in eco-
nomic and data quality regulation. The Privacy Rule preamble in
2000 notes that access helps people detect and correct errors in their
records,316 which, in the clinical setting, helps avoid medical errors
and in research settings helps ensure the integrity of data sets on
which scientific conclusions are based.317
Frischmann et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the citizen science movement). 
312. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 661 (1998) (noting that while “there is no
specifically enumerated right to research in the U.S. Constitution, certain commentators
argue that support for such a right could be derived from the Fourteenth Amendment right
to personal liberty and the First Amendment right to free speech” (footnote call number
omitted)); see also Natalie Ram, Science as Speech, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1198 (2017)
(arguing that scientific experimentation produces knowledge that is the basis for speech and
that, therefore, “the First Amendment must also be concerned with the production of ideas
and information”). 
313. See generally Barbara J. Evans, Power to the People: Data Citizens in the Age of
Precision Medicine, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 243 (2016) (discussing data citizenship in
which individuals who form data resources would exert meaningful governance control over
decisions about permissible data uses, privacy standards, and database policies).
314. See supra Part IV.B. 
315. See generally Evans, supra note 313.
316. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,606 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
317. See Danita Arrowood et al., Integrity of the Healthcare Record: Best Practices for EHR
Documentation (2013 Update), J. AHIMA (Aug. 2013), http://library.ahima.org/doc?oid=3002
57#.W9yNOi2ZOCR [https://perma.cc/6BRC-G52Q] (discussing data integrity problems in
electronic health records and various harms they can cause).
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The preamble to the 2014 Privacy Rule amendments notes that
individual access to laboratory data promotes “certain health reform
concepts” including personalized medicine, participatory medicine,
disease management, and prevention.318 It adds that individual ac-
cess supports HHS’s goals and commitments regarding widespread
adoption of electronic health records.319
The 2014 preamble emphasizes that individuals “have access to
interpretative information on laboratory results from many sources,
including the Internet.”320 This suggests that one of HHS’s goals was
to promote economic freedom and foster a competitive market in
unbundled genome interpretation services—that is, stand-alone
services that help people understand the significance of variants
detected by tests performed at other laboratories.321 Scholars note
that denying people access to their genomic data locks them into an
ongoing relationship with the same laboratory that administered
the test, raising antitrust concerns and denying their economic free-
dom to seek variant reinterpretation and second opinions from other
sources.322
A final, important role of HIPAA’s individual access right is to
reduce pressure for passage of state laws granting individuals
ownership rights in their data. Topol and Kish have cited the in-
adequacies of individual data access as grounds to favor individual
data ownership.323 This frustration reflects, in part, the fact that
HIPAA’s access right has not yet been effectively enforced.324 State
data ownership laws could create a national patchwork of require-
ments that interfere with the assembly of nationally scaled data
318. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290, 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 7295.
321. See Barbara J. Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, 42 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS (ISSUE 1 SUPPLEMENT) 51, 52-53 (discussing the unbundling of genomic testing
and interpretive services).
322. See, e.g., id. at 51-66.
323. Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Commentary, Unpatients—Why Patients Should Own
Their Medical Data, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 921, 922 (2015) (arguing that individual
ownership of data would serve important interests not being served by current rights of access
and control); Eric J. Topol, Comment, The Big Medical Data Miss: Challenges in Establishing
an Open Medical Resource, 16 NATURE REV. 253 (2015) (calling for data ownership).
324. See Kish & Topol, supra note 323, at 922; see also Lye et al., supra note 51 (doc-
umenting problems with HIPAA access). 
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sets and impede access to data for socially beneficial research and
public health activities.325 Blocking HIPAA access strengthens the
case for individual data ownership. HHS did not state this rationale
in its Privacy Rule preambles,326 but the threat of state data owner-
ship laws hangs heavily over the HIPAA access debate.
V. DISPLACING STATE LAWS THAT BLOCK TRANSPARENCY
GINA set a deadline of 2009 to place genetic information under
the HIPAA Privacy Rule and, by implication, to make genetic data
subject to HIPAA’s individual access right.327 HHS met the deadline
to extend basic privacy protections to all genetic information held at
HIPAA-covered facilities through an interim policy, pending final
Privacy Rule revisions in 2013.328 Implementing HIPAA access to
laboratory-held genomic data took even longer, until 2014.329
Creating a federal civil right of access to laboratory data proved
difficult because it required HHS to displace state law.330
A. State Law Barriers to Laboratory Data Access
The Health Care Financing Administration (HFCA), precursor of
today’s CMS, promulgated regulations implementing the 1988 CLIA
325. See AXELRAD, supra note 77 (discussing diverse state data ownership laws); see also
Barbara J. Evans & Susan M. Wolf, A Faustian Bargain That Undermines Research Partici-
pants’ Privacy Rights and Return of Results, 71 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=3368555 [https://perma.cc/C9C6-CBWP] (warning that efforts to stymie HIPAA
access could have the unintended consequence of adding to pressure for state data ownership
legislation).
326. Cf. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
327. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-233, § 105(b)(1),
122 Stat. 881, 905 (2008). 
328. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notifi-
cation Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules,
78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5568 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (amending
the Privacy Rule to protect genetic information as defined by GINA). 
329. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 7290 (amending the HIPAA and CLIA regulations to support the individual access
right). 
330. See infra Part V.A.
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statute in 1992.331 Those 1992 regulations, still in effect when the
Privacy Rule was first developed, looked to the states to define who
was an “authorized person” that could receive laboratory data.332
States traditionally regulated the practice of medicine, including
whether test results should be delivered directly to patients or to
their physicians.333 If a state failed to specify who was authorized
to receive laboratory data, CLIA defaulted to a rule that the “au-
thorized person” was the person who ordered the test—usually a
healthcare provider rather than the tested individual.334 Otherwise,
state law governed.335 If HIPAA’s access right required laboratories
to release data to individuals, this would violate the laws of some
states and, consequently, would violate the CLIA regulations.
HHS, writing in 2000, expressed frustration at this state of af-
fairs336 but was reluctant to preempt the state laws that were block-
ing individual access at that time.337 Executive Order 13132338 on
federalism went into effect on November 4, 1999, one day after HHS
first proposed the Privacy Rule.339 HHS scrupulously complied with
it when developing the final Privacy Rule published in December
2000.340 Executive Order 13132 requires federal agencies to consult
with states about new federal regulations,341 and these consultations
revealed that the states were alarmed that the Privacy Rule would
preempt state laws.342 The Privacy Rule was famously contentious:
331. Medicare, Medicaid and CLIA Programs; Regulations Implementing the Clinical Lab-
oratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7002 (Feb. 28, 1992) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 410, 416, 417, 418, 440, 482, 483, 484, 485, 488, 491, 493, and
494).
332. Id. at 7013.
333. See Evans, supra note 6, at 6.
334. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,462, 82,485 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (discussing, in
the preamble to the original Privacy Rule, the role of state law in determining individual
access to laboratory information).
335. Id.
336. Id. (commenting, “we believe individuals should be able to have access to their indi-
vidually identifiable health information”). 
337. See id. at 82,797.
338. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999).
339. Id. at 43,259.
340. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 82,797-98.
341. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,256, § 3(a).
342. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
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the proposed rulemaking drew over 52,000 public comments.343 The
year 2000 was not an opportune moment for HHS to court avoidable
conflicts with the states.344 Only under GINA’s prodding, eight years
later, did HHS finally press forward in addressing state law barriers
to HIPAA access.345
Even under the original, year-2000 HIPAA Privacy Rule, labo-
ratories still had to comply with HIPAA’s access right in states
where the term “authorized person” included the tested indi-
vidual.346 Moreover, if the individual was the person who ordered
the test, laboratories also had to allow HIPAA access.347 But the
laws of many states—and CLIA’s deference to those laws—prevent-
ed many Americans from accessing their laboratory-held data.348
In 2000, HHS expressed hope that people would nevertheless be
able to access their laboratory test results: “Although we are con-
cerned about the lack of immediate access by the individual, we
believe that, in most cases, individuals who receive clinical tests will
be able to receive their test results or reports through the health-
care provider who ordered the test for them.”349 In other words, HHS
hoped that laboratory test results would find their way into physi-
cians’ files where individuals could access them because most phy-
sicians are HIPAA-covered and subject to the access right.350
Reg. at 82,797-98.
343. Grace Ko, Partial Preemption Under the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 497, 500 & n.23. (2006).
344. See generally id. (discussing concerns with the Privacy Rule as it was being prom-
ulgated).
345. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-233,
§ 105(b)(1), 122 Stat. 881, 905 (requiring amendments to ensure that genetic information, as
broadly defined by GINA, would receive HIPAA’s privacy protections, which include an access
right).
346. Standard for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. at
82,485.
347. Id.
348. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290, 7307-08 tbl.4 (Feb. 6, 2014) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164)
(listing the states in which people were not able to access their laboratory-held data under the
original HIPAA Privacy Rule).
349. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 82,485.
350. See Health Information Privacy: Covered Entities and Business Associations, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/
index.html [https://perma.cc/BYL8-LTEV].
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The shift to genomic testing after 2000 dashed this hope. The vast
majority of genomic information—even from clinical genomic
tests—lacks clinical significance351 and is never reported to HIPAA-
covered healthcare providers but remains stored at the laboratory.352
Without a right of access to laboratory-held information, people lack
an effective right of access to their genomic information, most of
which never leaves the laboratory even when testing is performed
at a CLIA-certified clinical lab.353
Lack of access is an even greater problem for data generated at
research laboratories. As already noted, most gene sequencing to
date has been performed as part of biomedical research, so research
laboratories hold much of the genomic data now in storage.354
Sequencing produces a vast amount of data about a person’s gene
variants, which are the thousands, even millions, of points at which
the person’s genes differ from an idealized human reference ge-
nome.355 For most of these variants, nobody yet knows how they
affect health, so the variant cannot be interpreted in the sense of
explaining its clinical validity or utility (health impact).356 Even if
a variant’s health impact is well understood, research laboratories
may not bother to interpret it if the information is irrelevant to the
focus of their research.357 Thus, a study of cystic fibrosis may not
take time to interpret nonfocal (unrelated) variants with known
associations to diabetes risk.358 A research lab may interpret just a
handful of gene variants relevant to the research, but nevertheless
351. See Dewey et al., supra note 18.
352. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 7295 (noting that “test reports [i.e., the reports that laboratories convey to health-care
providers] may be only part of a designated record set that a HIPAA-covered laboratory
holds”); see also Barbara J. Evans et al., Regulatory Changes Raise Troubling Questions for
Genomic Testing, 16 GENETICS MED. 799, 800 (2014) (discussing the types of data that
laboratories develop in the course of conducting genetic testing, much of which lacks clinical
significance and therefore may not be reported to healthcare providers). 
353. See supra notes 351-52.
354. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
355. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 121; Kohane et al., supra note 17, at 400.
356. Dewey et al., supra note 18. 
357. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research Results in Genomic
Research Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14 GENETICS MED. 361, 364 (2012).
358. Id. (distinguishing findings “discovered in the course of research, when the finding is
on the focal variables under study in meeting the stated aims of the research project” from
nonfocal variables that do not advance the aims of the research).
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keep files recording all of the person’s variant data: the focal vari-
ants interpreted as part of the research, plus other variants that
were uninterpreted or uninterpretable.359
All of this stored information presents potential risks to a per-
son’s privacy and civil rights, and people want access to it.360 Many
(although not all) research laboratories, including those affiliated
with large academic medical centers, are subject to the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.361 Yet, under the year-2000 rule, HIPAA access to lab-
oratory data was constrained by state law.362 As of 2014, HHS found
that only nine U.S. states and territories authorized direct individ-
ual access to laboratory test reports; seven allowed individual access
with a doctor’s approval; twenty-six were silent about individual
access, and; thirteen only allowed healthcare providers to access a
person’s data.363
B. GINA as a Federal Civil Rights Intervention
The February 2014 final rule creating HIPAA’s right of access to
laboratory data did two things. It eliminated the Privacy Rule’s ear-
lier access exceptions that placed most laboratory data outside
HIPAA’s access right,364 and it made conforming changes to the
CLIA regulation permitting laboratories to provide HIPAA access.365
CLIA’s general reporting rules continue to look to state law to define
who is “authorized” to receive laboratory data,366 but HHS empha-
sized that the HIPAA Privacy Rule preempts any state law that im-
pairs people’s HIPAA access right.367
359. Evans et al., supra note 352, at 800 (describing the many types of data that
laboratories generate as a byproduct of genomic testing).
360. See Parker, supra note 252, at 456 (“What appears rather consistent across most of
these studies is the finding that a substantial proportion of people express a desire for
receiving research results.”).
361. See Evans et al., supra note 352, at 801 (explaining situations in which research lab-
oratories may become HIPAA-covered entities).
362. See supra notes 331-35 and accompanying text.
363. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290, 7307 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
364. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018).
365. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(l).
366. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1291(f); 42 C.F.R. § 493.2.
367. CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 7304.
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Patients and patient advocates who commented on this rule-
making uniformly supported direct patient access to laboratory test
results, citing dignitary, liberty, and even property interests in
access to their data.368 In contrast, comments by physicians empha-
sized laypeople’s lack of sophistication and the alleged harms they
might suffer if granted direct access.369 State medical practice regu-
lations that block individual access to laboratory data embody these
concerns about the public’s scientific illiteracy.370
GINA, like the Voting Rights Act of 1965,371 was a federal inter-
vention to displace state laws that were interfering with important
civil rights.372 “Like the right to vote, access to one’s own data is a
foundational civil right that empowers people to protect all their
other civil rights.”373 Like the Voting Rights Act, GINA challenged
deeply held establishment convictions that people’s civil rights
should be curtailed, both for their own good and for the good of soci-
ety, based on a perception that they are illiterate374—in this case,
medically and scientifically illiterate.
In 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that nineteen states had
laws requiring people to prove literacy before they could vote.375 The
right to vote is a federally protected civil right,376 but states admin-
ister the process of voter registration.377 Literacy tests have a cer-
tain rationale. In the nineteenth century, a Massachusetts literacy
368. See Individual Comments, http://www.regulations.gov [https://perma.cc/CV28-HR3Y]
(referencing rulemaking file CMS-2011-0145), at document references CMS-2011-0145-0022,
CMS-2011-0145-0035, CMS-2001-0145-0039, CMS-2011-0145-0063, CMS-2011-0145-0073,
CMS-2011-0045-0079, CMS-2011-0145-0090, CMS-2011-0145-0104, CMS-2011-0145-0105,
CMS-2011-0145-0120, CMS-2011-0145-0166. 
369. See Physician Comments, http://www.regulations.gov (referencing rulemaking file
CMS-2011-0145), at document references, CMS-2011-0145-0042, CMS-2011-0145-0038, CMS-
2011-0145-0007, CMS-2011-0145-0019.
370. See supra Part IV.A. 
371. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301-10314, 10501-10508, 10701-10702 (Supp. III 2016)).
372. See supra Part IV; notes 323-26 and accompanying text.
373. Evans, supra note 6, at 6-7.
374. See id.; see also supra Part IV.A.
375. See Lassiter v. Northhampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52 n.7 (1959) (listing
nineteen states that imposed literacy tests as a condition of voter registration).
376. See Voting Right Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301-10314, 10501-10508, 10701-10702 (Supp. III 2016)).
377. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sen-
ators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”).
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test was said to “insure an ‘independent and intelligent’ exercise of
the right of suffrage.”378 Literacy and intelligence are not necessar-
ily correlated, but literacy does promote informed voting “in our
society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed
matter canvass and debate campaign issues.”379 An ethical person
could conclude that letting illiterate people vote may lead them to
make bad choices that harm themselves and society. In Lassiter v.
Northhampton County Board of Elections, the Supreme Court did
not “sit in judgment on the wisdom” of state literacy tests, and held
that they were not, in themselves, unconstitutional.380
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Lassiter, spotted a
problem and invited plaintiffs to raise it in future federal proceed-
ings.381 Literacy testing, however well-motivated it may sometimes
be, can have discriminatory impacts that divest entire classes of
people of important civil rights.382 Several years later, Congress
addressed this problem in the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which was
“designed to attack the clear moral wrong of deliberate disfran-
chisement in the Jim Crow South.”383 It did not single out South-
ern states, but it instead applied a two-pronged test.384 States were
covered by the legislation if they applied a literacy test and had
total voter turnout (across all races) below 50 percent in the 1964
presidential election.385 These covered states—which happened to be
in the South—were placed under “federal receivership, with every
change in any aspect of voting subject to pre-approval by either the
[U.S. Department of Justice] or the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.”386
378. Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 52 (quoting Stone v. Smith, 34 N.E. 521, 521 (Mass. 1893)).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 53.
381. Id. at 50 (“[The] issue of discrimination in the actual operation of the ballot laws of
North Carolina has not been framed in the issues presented for the state court litigation. So
we do not reach it. But we mention it in passing so that it may be clear that nothing we say
or do here will prejudice appellant in tendering that issue in the federal proceedings which
await the termination of this state court litigation.” (internal citation omitted)).
382. See id.
383. Abigail Thernstrom, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: By Now, A Murky Mess, 5 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 42-43 (2007).
384. See id. at 42.
385. Id. at 43.
386. Id. at 47.
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The federal government thus stepped in to correct state laws that
were divesting people of federally protected civil rights based on
their perceived literacy.387 Like today’s scientific literacy standards
that seemingly can be met only if a person has advanced training
in medicine or science,388 the literacy tests at issue in the Voting
Rights Act were highly contrived to favor voter qualification of an
entrenched elite.389 The Voting Rights intervention was effective.390
The percentage of African American adults registered to vote rose
from 19.3 percent in March 1965 to 51.6 percent by September 1967
in Alabama and, in Mississippi, the figure rose from 6.7 percent to
59.8 percent in two years.391
In a tragic echo of the Voting Rights Act, the individual access
right GINA created has elicited a strong resistance that—as the
remainder of this Article explores—has included instances of public
officials acting under the color of law to block the newly created civil
right.392 The Article concludes, however, that this resistance is not
willful, but rather it is the product of misunderstanding about what
the access right is. The access right is judged as if it were a con-
sumer health and safety regulation, when in fact it is a civil rights
law.393
VI. INDIVIDUAL DATA ACCESS AFTER GINA
The core of the conflict relates to the breadth of HIPAA’s access
right. This makes it necessary to offer a brief introduction to the me-
chanics of the access right. The Privacy Rule was first promulgated
in December 2000394 and, after minor revisions in 2002,395 took effect
on a phased schedule in 2003-2004. The Privacy Rule has always
387. See id. at 43-44.
388. See supra Part IV.A.
389. See Thernstrom, supra note 383, at 42-43, 47.
390. See id. at 44.
391. Id.
392. See infra Part VII.
393. See infra notes 510-14 and accompanying text.
394. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
395. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg.
53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
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included an individual access right.396 The basic mechanics of this
access right have not changed over the years and are summarized
below. GINA led to Privacy Rule amendments in 2013397 and 2014.398
The summary below highlights differences between the original ac-
cess right and the post-GINA access right in effect since 2014.
A. Application and Enforcement
HIPAA’s individual access right is a legally enforceable civil right
arising under 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.399 With limited exceptions,
HIPAA-covered entities must provide access in response to an indi-
vidual’s request within thirty days with one 30-day extension
permissible if the covered entity provides a written explanation.400
Failure to provide access can lead to administrative enforcement
action and civil penalties.401 Entities that are not HIPAA-covered
are not required to provide access.402
B. Exceptions Allowing Denial of Individual Access
1. Exceptions That Have Not Changed Over Time
The Privacy Rule provides very narrow grounds for a covered en-
tity to deny HIPAA access.403 HHS intends for covered entities to
396. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2018).
397. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the
HIPAA Rules; 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164)
(amending the Privacy Rule to protect genetic information as defined by GINA). 
398. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
399. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
400. See id. § 164.524(b)(2) (providing for access within thirty days, with up to one thirty-
day extension possible if the covered entity provides a written explanation). 
401. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Uplift Med., P.C., No. RWT 11cv2168, 2012 WL 8251345, at *1
(D. Md. Aug. 30, 2012) (enforcing civil fines of $4.3 million for denial of timely HIPAA access
by forty-one patients, or approximately $100,000 per denied patient). 
402. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 7294.
403. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)-(3) (describing nonreviewable and reviewable grounds
for denial of access).
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invoke these access exceptions “rarely, if at all.”404 They include, for
example, exceptions for data held by correctional facilities and data
that would divulge confidential information about third parties.405
There are reviewable grounds for a covered entity to deny access to
data that would endanger the “life or physical safety” of the request-
ing person or another party,406 but HHS construes this access excep-
tion very narrowly (for example, suicide risk qualifies, but mere
emotional distress or psychosocial harm do not).407 
There is also a limited research exception to HIPAA access.408
Some research facilities, including many of those affiliated with
large academic medical centers, are subject to the HIPAA Privacy
Rule.409 Their data files are subject to HIPAA’s access right.410
HIPAA’s access right has always—ever since the Privacy Rule was
finalized in December 2000411—allowed access to both research and
clinical data as long as the data are stored at a HIPAA-covered
facility. Precisely for this reason, the Privacy Rule has always had
an access exception allowing research sites to suspend research par-
ticipants’ access rights temporarily during a clinical trial.412 Other-
wise, research participants could access their data and “un-blind”
404. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed,
Reg. 59,918, 59,981 (proposed Nov 3, 1999).
405. See id. at 59,938, 59,982-83.
406. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(3)(i).
407. See CLIA Program an HIPAA Privacy Rule, Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 7296; see also Conference: Return of Genetic Results in the All of Us Research Program,
NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Mar. 7, 2017), https://videocast.nih.gov/summary.asp?Live=21887&bh
cp=1 [https://perma.cc/P6AC-JTEV] (statement by Deven McGraw, J.D., MPH, Deputy Direc-
tor of Health Information Privacy, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil
Rights) (discussing the narrowness of this access exception). 
408. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii).
409. See Evans et al., supra note 352, at 801 (explaining situations in which research
laboratories may become HIPAA-covered entities).
410. See id.
411. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information; Final Rule,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (promulgating
the HIPAA Privacy Rule and including the access right at 45 C.F.R. § 164.524).
412. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii); see also OCR, 2016 ACCESS GUIDANCE, supra note
308 (summarizing this exception as allowing access to be delayed if the requested information
is “in a designated record set that is part of a research study that includes treatment (e.g.,
clinical trial) and is still in progress, provided the individual agreed to the temporary
suspension of access when consenting to participate in the research. The individual’s right of
access is reinstated upon completion of the research”).
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the trial.413 This exception allows research data to be withheld tem-
porarily and only if the individual agreed to the denial of access
when consenting to the research.414 Access must be reinstated upon
completion of the research,415 so data from completed studies can
never qualify for this exception.
2. Changes in 2014 that Altered Exceptions for Laboratory-Held
Data
The original Privacy Rule did not require HIPAA access to data
held by CLIA-regulated and CLIA-exempt laboratories416 located in
states where direct individual access to laboratory data would vio-
late state law.417 HHS interpreted this exception as also encompass-
ing data held by research laboratories that operate under CLIA’s
research exception.418 The 2014 Privacy Rule revisions eliminated
these exceptions, and HIPAA-covered clinical and research labora-
tories are now subject to HIPAA’s access right.419
413. HHS Recommendations, supra note 195, § II.C.2.
414. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii).
415. Id. 
416. CLIA-regulated and exempt laboratories are those that comply with the CLIA
regulation, either by obtaining a CLIA certificate or by complying with the licensing
requirements of a state (New York or Washington) where HHS has determined the state law
requirements are equivalent to CLIA. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.2; see also List of Exempt States
Under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendment, supra note 151.
417. These exceptions to laboratory data access were in 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1)(iii) of the
pre-2014 Privacy Rule. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test
Reports, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7291 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45
C.F.R. pt. 164) (explaining, in the preamble to the 2014 final rule granting laboratory data
access, that the right of access under the original Privacy Rule did not apply to “[p]rotected
health information maintained by a covered entity that is—(1) subject to CLIA to the extent
the provision of access to the individual would be prohibited by law; or (2) exempt from CLIA.
These exceptions, found at § 164.524(a)(1)(iii)(A) and (B) of the [original] Privacy Rule, cover
test reports and other protected health information only at CLIA and CLIA-exempt labo-
ratories”). HHS emphasized that for purposes of this access exception, it interpreted “exempt”
laboratories as including research laboratories operating under CLIA’s research exception.
See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,485 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
418. See supra note 417; see also 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
419. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 7290.
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C. Scope of Information Access After GINA
1. Basic Access Provisions that Have Not Changed Over Time
Individuals have a right of access to their “designated record set”
(DRS),420 which HHS modeled on the “system of records” to which
individuals have access under the Privacy Act of 1974.421 The Pri-
vacy Rule defines the DRS as:
A group of records maintained by or for a covered entity that is:
(i) The medical records and billing records about individuals
maintained by or for a covered health care provider; (ii) The
enrollment, payment, claims adjudication, and case or medical
management record systems maintained by or for a health plan;
or (iii) Used, in whole or in part, by or for the covered entity to
make decisions about individuals.422
The term “record” refers to “any item, collection, or grouping of in-
formation that includes protected health information [PHI] and is
maintained, collected, used, or disseminated by or for a covered
entity.”423
There is no requirement for covered entities to provide interpre-
tive assistance to help people understand the significance of their
data.424 Thus, the HIPAA access right is a data-only right: what the
covered entity has on file is what you get. HIPAA’s access right does
not, however, include psychotherapy notes or data compiled in antic-
ipation of civil, criminal, or administrative legal proceedings.425
420. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (defining the DRS); see also id. § 160.103 (defining “health
information” as used in the definition of the DRS). 
421. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.
Reg. 59,918, 59,980-81 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999).
422. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.
423. Id.
424. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 7293 (stating, in the preamble to the final rule granting laboratory data access, “[f]i-
nally, we clarify that this final rule does not require that laboratories interpret test results
for patients. Patients merely have the right to inspect and receive a copy of their completed
test reports and other individually identifiable health information maintained in a designated
record set by a HIPAA-covered laboratory”).
425. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1)(i)-(ii).
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The accessible DRS only includes data that is “maintained” by or
for the HIPAA-covered entity.426 Data cease to be part of an individ-
ual’s DRS if the covered entity discards or destroys the data.427 The
HIPAA Privacy Rule does not itself impose any record-retention
requirement.428 Moreover, the DRS only includes data that can be
clearly identified as relating to the individual.429 This is implicit in
the definitions that “records” include PHI, and PHI is “individually
identifiable” information.430 Data stored in de-identified form are no
longer part of a person’s DRS.431
2. Changes in 2013 that Expanded the Range of Genomic Data
Subject to HIPAA Access 
Under the original Privacy Rule, genomic information was PHI
only to the extent it was health information.432 If clinically signifi-
cant test results had been reported into medical records held by a
person’s healthcare providers, those results were PHI and were ac-
cessible via HIPAA access requests to the healthcare provider.433
GINA required “genetic information,” broadly defined, to be plac-
ed under the Privacy Rule.434 In 2013,435 HHS complied with this
directive by changing the Privacy Rule’s definition of PHI to include
“genetic information” as defined by GINA.436 This amendment vastly
expanded the amount of genetic information that was considered
426. Id. § 164.524(a)(1).
427. See id.
428. See generally 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164. 
429. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (defining the term “record” as used in the definition of the
DRS).
430. See id.; see also id. § 160.103 (defining “health information” and “protected health
information”). 
431. See id. § 160.103.
432. See supra Part II.
433. See supra notes 349-50 and accompanying text.
434. See supra Part II.
435. See Modification to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the
HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5568 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160,
164) (amending the Privacy Rule to protect genetic information as defined by GINA). 
436. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining the DRS); see also supra note 130 (describing GINA-
related amendments affecting the health information included in the DRS); notes 169-71 and
accompanying text (describing the breadth of genetic information now included).
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PHI and hence part of an individual’s DRS. Post-GINA, a person’s
DRS includes virtually any genetic testing data a HIPAA-covered
entity has on file, regardless of whether the data are clinically
significant or have analytic validity, clinical validity, or clinical util-
ity, and regardless of whether the laboratory has reported it to a
healthcare provider.437
VII. THE CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATORY EMPIRE STRIKES BACK:
SAFETY AND TRANSPARENCY IN CONFLICT
A. Concerns About Individual Access to Research Data
Regulations and bioethical standards historically have been mu-
tually reinforcing given their shared goal of protecting individuals.
The formalization of genomic civil rights regulations after GINA
exposed a rift between the two. The rift concerns how safety and
civil rights should be prioritized if the two come into conflict.
1. FDA Expresses Concern
Three days before HIPAA’s right of access to laboratory data
“went live” on October 6, 2014, FDA published two draft guidances
proposing to expand FDA’s oversight of laboratory-developed
tests—a category that includes many tests used in genomic re-
search.438 One of the drafts suggested that research laboratories
would need to obtain an Investigational Device Exemption (IDE)
from FDA if experimental “test results are returned to patients
without confirmation by a medically accepted diagnostic product or
procedure.”439 To be clear, FDA long has had the power to require
437. See supra note 436.
438. Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests; Draft Guidance
for Industry, Food and Drug Administration Staff, and Clinical Laboratories; Availability, 79
Fed. Reg. 59,776 (Oct. 3, 2014); Food & Drug Administration Notification and Medical Device
Reporting for Laboratory Developed Tests; Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug
Administration Staff, and Clinical Laboratories; Availability, 79 Fed. Reg. 59,779 (Oct. 3,
2014).
439. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FRAMEWORK FOR REG-
ULATORY OVERSIGHT OF LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS: DRAFT GUIDANCE 36-37 (2014), https:
//www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/
ucm416685.pdf [https://perma.cc/B28U-TNCJ]. 
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an IDE when investigational devices (those that have not been
cleared or approved by FDA)440 are used in studies that pose “signi-
ficant risk” for the research subjects.441 For example, FDA can re-
quire an IDE if research uses an experimental test as the basis for
making decisions that affect research participants’ safety.442 An ex-
ample would be using experimental test results to assign partici-
pants to receive one or another cancer drug during a clinical trial
“without confirmation of the diagnosis by another, medically estab-
lished diagnostic product or procedure.”443
It thus was not surprising that FDA’s 2014 draft guidance stated
that FDA can sometimes require IDEs when experimental genomic
tests are used in research.444 The surprise lay in its suggestion that
merely allowing research subjects to exercise their HIPAA access
rights might be a “significant risk” activity that triggers the need for
an IDE.445 This was all the more surprising because HIPAA access
is a “data-only” right that merely allows access to data (such as un-
interpreted variant data) that a laboratory holds in its files; HIPAA
does not require laboratories to provide any interpretive assistance
or make any statements about the clinical significance of the data.446
In the years leading up to the 2014 draft guidance, FDA officials
had signaled that the agency would not view “data-only” direct-to-
consumer testing services—those that provide variant data without
making interpretive statements—to be medical devices that FDA
can regulate.447
440. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.3(g) (1991).
441. Medical Devices; Procedures for Investigational Device Exemptions, 45 Fed. Reg.
3732, 3738 (Jan. 18, 1980). See generally Barbara J. Evans, The Limits of FDA’s Authority to
Regulate Clinical Research Involving High-Throughput Genome Sequencing, 70 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 259, 264-70 (2015) (discussing FDA’s authority to require IDEs in academic research
where the use of an investigational device poses significant risk to research participants).
442. See Evans, supra note 441, at 264.
443. 21 C.F.R. § 812.2(c)(3)(iv) (2018).
444. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 439,
at 36.
445. See id. at 36-37. 
446. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports; Final
Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7293 (Feb. 6, 2014) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt.
164); see also supra Part VI.C.
447. Dan Vorhaus, DTC Testing and the FDA: Is There an End in Sight to the Regulatory
Uncertainty?, PRIVACY L. REP. (June 16, 2011), https://theprivacyreport.com/2011/06/16/dtc-
genetic-testing-and-the-fda-is-there-an-end-in-sight-to-the-regulatory-uncertainty/ [https://
perma.cc/Q6CM-UBX3].
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The 2014 draft guidance did not clearly state that HIPAA access
would trigger the need for an IDE, yet it raised the possibility.448
FDA later elected not to finalize the draft guidance, to the relief
of research laboratories.449 HIPAA sets a thirty-day deadline, ex-
tendable once to sixty days, for laboratories to provide HIPAA ac-
cess when an individual requests it.450 Timely access is mandatory,
with only limited exceptions.451 Obtaining an IDE can take many
months.452 Complying with both demands would have been im-
possible.
2. CMS Complicates HIPAA Access
CMS joined OCR in promulgating the February 2014 final rule on
laboratory data access,453 implying that CMS saw no conflict be-
tween the HIPAA and CLIA regulations at that time. Shortly after
the new access right took effect, however, CMS published a portable
data format (PDF) file454 on its main CLIA web page.455 This PDF
file suggests that research laboratories operating under CLIA’s re-
search exception456 will violate the CLIA regulations if they comply
448. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note
439, at 36-37.
449. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DISCUSSION PAPER ON LAB-
ORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS (LDTS) (2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/
productsandmedicalprocedures/invitrodiagnostics/laboratorydevelopedtests/ucm536965.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HN5A-W4G9] (noting that FDA recently announced it would not be issuing
final guidance on laboratory developed tests to allow further discussion).
450. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(b)(2) (2018).
451. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)-(3) (2018) (describing nonreviewable and reviewable
grounds for denial of access).
452. See Evans, supra note 441, at 260.
453. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports; Final
Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290, 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R.
pt. 164).
454. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., RESEARCH TESTING AND CLINICAL LAB-
ORATORY IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS OF 1988 (CLIA) REGULATIONS (2014), https://www.cms.
gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/Research-Testing-and-CLIA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76YH-E4HT]. 
455. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/index.
html?redirect=/CLIA/ [https://perma.cc/8QTB-8ZZV] (publishing the PDF file in the
“Downloads” section).
456. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
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with HIPAA’s access right.457 The PDF file does not disclose its
authorship, leaving it vague whether it is an official statement by
CMS or merely an analysis by an unnamed CMS staff member.458 It
was never published in the Federal Register, as the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)459 requires when federal agencies issue an
interpretative rule or general policy statement (together, “guidance
document”).460 Nevertheless, its prominent display on CMS’s main
CLIA web page conveys the impression that CMS endorses it. It has
created a perceived conflict of regulations that has had the practi-
cal effect of blocking individuals’ HIPAA access rights at some re-
search laboratories.461 
The position expressed in CMS’s PDF file contradicts the plain
text of the CLIA statute and the CLIA regulations.462 The scope of
457. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 454.
458. See id.
459. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
460. See 5 U.S.C. §553(b)(3)(A) (providing an exception to the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirement when agencies issue “interpretative [sic, that is, interpretive] rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice,” which scholars
refer to collectively as non-legislative rules. This exception applies unless another statute,
such as the agency’s enabling statute, provides otherwise.). But see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D)
(requiring interpretative rules to be published in the Federal Register); Sean Croston, The
Petition is Mightier than the Sword: Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battles Over
‘Regulation Through Guidance,’ 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 381, 382 (2011) (defining guidance docu-
ments as “those official ‘statement[s] of general applicability and future effect, other than
[regulations]’ that set forth ‘a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or on in-
terpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue’” (alterations in original) (quoting Office of Man-
agement and Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432,
3434 (Jan 25, 2007), which drew on the Administrative Procedure Act’s definition of a “rule”
at 5 U.S.C. 551(4) in developing this definition)); Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive
for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 334 n.14 (2011) (citing
Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents in the States: Toward a Safe Harbor, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 631, 632 (2002) for using “guidance documents” to refer collectively to policy statements
and interpret[at]ive rules). 
461. Steven J. Keating, personal communication (Jan. 5, 2018) (on file with author) (noting,
with respect to the access barriers, “[T]he CLIA/HIPAA issue you describe is the exact barrier
that prevented me from accessing my own tumor genome that was done in a research study
at my own university a couple years ago”).
462. See generally Evans & Wolf, supra note 325 (providing a detailed analysis of the
statutory provisions summarized here); see also Attachment C: Return of Individual Results
and Special Consideration of Issues Arising from Amendments of HIPAA and CLIA, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/
recommendations/2015-september-28-attachment-c/index.html [https://perma.cc/5856-3E9S]
(finding this position to be “at odds with the plain language” of the CLIA regulation).
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CLIA’s applicability is mind-numbing subject matter but merits a
brief discussion because people’s civil rights depend on it.
The current CLIA statute copied its jurisdictional provision from
earlier legislation, the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of
1967.463 The CLIA framework has always been directed at clinical
laboratories that perform tests to support patient care in clinical
healthcare settings, rather than at research laboratories that per-
form tests to advance scientific discovery.464 The statute implements
this intent through its jurisdictional provision, which states that
CLIA only applies to laboratories that perform tests for the purpose
of “providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment
of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of,
human beings.”465 Two points stand out about this provision: first,
it is intent-based and, second, it is an artful exercise in federal-
ism.466 
On this first point, CLIA does not supply a special definition for
the word “for,” so the word takes its ordinary meaning.467 The pri-
mary meaning of “for” is as “a function word to indicate purpose”
and “to indicate an intended goal.”468 To fall under CLIA, a labora-
tory must do two things: it must perform an act (“providing informa-
tion”) and possess scienter: namely, the laboratory must act with
intent for the information to be used in clinical health care (“diag-
nosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or
463. Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 536.
464. See 113 CONG. REC. 26006 (1967) (statement of Rep. Harley O. Staggers, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Interstate Foreign Commerce, on the occasion when the House bill that became
the 1967 Clinical Laboratory & Improvement Act was reported out of Committee) (noting that
“it should be pointed out that the bill does not cover laboratories engaged in research where
examination of specimens is directed toward that end rather to the treatment of patients”).
465. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012); see also 81 Stat. at 536 (showing the language of the 1967
version of 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a), which was the same as the current jurisdictional provision,
except that it used the term “health of man” instead of the more modern “health of human
beings”).
466. See infra this Part.
467. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 69 (2012) (describing the “Ordinary-Meaning Canon,” which provides that “[w]ords are
to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates they bear
a technical sense”).
468. See For, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/for [https://perma.cc/N5UE-C32W] (stating, as the primary definition of the word “for”:
“a—used as a function word to indicate purpose” and “b—used as a function word to
indicate an intended goal”). 
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the assessment of the health of, human beings”).469 CLIA’s intent-
based jurisdictional scheme closely resembles the approach Con-
gress took in FDA’s jurisdictional provisions, which ask whether a
manufacturer intends its product for clinical use, when deciding
whether the product is an FDA-regulated “drug” or “device.”470 
On the second point, states have long been concerned about fed-
eral intrusions on their authority to regulate the practice of med-
icine.471 State medical practice acts, regulations, and common law
define the scope of medical practice and when it begins and ends.472
Honoring longstanding principles of federalism, CLIA does not
define the terms “diagnosis,” “prevention,” “treatment,” and “assess-
ment of health.”473 Instead, CLIA leaves it for the States to decide
the meaning of these terms and, hence, the scope of CLIA’s applica-
bility within their jurisdictions.474 
The CLIA regulations draw their jurisdictional language directly
from the CLIA statute.475 This was a deliberate choice by CMS’s
469. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a).
470. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (defining “drug[s]” that FDA has jurisdiction to regulate); id.
§ 321(h) (Supp. IV 2017) (defining FDA-regulated devices, including diagnostic devices). 
471. See, e.g., Joel E. Hoffman, Administrative Procedures of the Food and Drug
Administration, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT
THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS 159, 165-66 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 1997) (discussing the
intense debate about federal power to regulate medical practice that preceded passage of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in the 1930s).
472. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 373 §§ 3, 5, 6, 9, Thompson Reuters (database updated
Feb. 2019) (discussing sources of state law that define the scope of medical practice and
clinical care); Patrick D. Blake, Note, Redefining Physicians’ Duties: An Argument for
Eliminating the Physician-Patient Relationship Requirement in Actions for Medical
Malpractice, 40 GA. L. REV. 573 (2006) (same).
473. Cf. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102
Stat. 2903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 263a) (which lacks definitions for these terms).
474. See Medicare, Medicaid and CLIA Programs; Regulations Implementing the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) and Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Act Program Fee Collection, 58 Fed. Reg. 5215, 5218-19 (Jan. 19, 1993) (reaffirming, in the
preamble to 1993 revisions to the CLIA regulations, that the Health Care Financing
Administration [the former name of today’s CMS] did not intend to regulate laboratories that
report results for purposes unrelated to the “patient care context which helps define the scope
of the CLIA statute and these regulations”); see also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 373, supra
note 472, §§ 3, 5, 6, 9; Blake, supra note 472.
475. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.1 (2018) (applying the CLIA regulations to “all laboratories as
defined under ‘laboratory’ in § 493.2 of this part”); id. § 493.2 (defining “laboratory” using the
same language the CLIA statute uses: as a facility that conducts tests for the purpose of
“providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or impair-
ment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a)
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predecessor, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), as
it updated the regulations after passage of the 1988 CLIA statute.476
During that rulemaking, research laboratories expressed divergent
concerns, with some wanting reassurance that they would not be
CLIA-regulated while others wanted to have CLIA-regulated sta-
tus.477 In its proposed rule, HCFA tried to interpret the statute’s
definition of a “laboratory” so as to clarify which research laborato-
ries would fall under CLIA.478 The final rule, however, rejected this
approach in favor of simply “parroting” the statute’s definition of a
regulated “laboratory.”479 HCFA stated that the statute “clearly
defines the type of facility subject to regulation and is specific with
respect to its applicability.”480 In the post-Chevron481 world, HCFA
felt Congress had clearly spoken to the issue, leaving no room for
the regulations to add anything.482 
HFCA did clarify one important point by inserting a research
exception in the CLIA regulations.483 Recall that CLIA’s basic rule
is that a laboratory falls under the CLIA regulations by “providing
information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any
disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human
beings.”484 The research exception interprets and narrows the
(2012) (using this same language). 
476. See Medicare, Medicaid and CLIA Programs; Regulations Implementing the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. 7002, 7015 (Feb. 28,
1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. Parts 405, 410, 416, 417, 418, 440, 482, 483, 484, 485, 488,
491, 493, and 494).
477. See id. (discussing the laboratories’ various concerns). 
478. See Medicare, Medicaid and CLIA Programs; Regulations Implementing the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA ‘88), 55 Fed. Reg. 20896, 20917
(proposed May 21, 1990) (proposing a definition of “laboratory” at 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 that added
to the statutory language at 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a)).
479. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (recognizing an exception to Auer defer-
ence when an agency is interpreting a regulation that simply parrots, or incorporates, statu-
tory language). See generally Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J.L.
& LIBERTY 290 (2011) (discussing the exception recognized in Gonzales v. Oregon).
480. Medicare, Medicaid and CLIA Programs; Regulations Implementing the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), 57 Fed. Reg. at 7014.
481. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
482. See id. at 842-83 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”).
483. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2018).
484. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (2012) (emphasis added); 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1, 493.2 (emphasis
added).
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phrase “providing information”485 to highlight one particular type of
information that it is potentially problematic for research laborato-
ries to provide: patient-specific test results. The research exception
states that a research laboratory escapes CLIA jurisdiction if it
“do[es] not report patient specific results for the diagnosis, preven-
tion, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assess-
ment of the health of individual patients.”486 This stresses that
reporting “patient-specific results” is the act that may cause a
research laboratory to fall under CLIA, but only if the laboratory
does so with the required scienter.487 Providing patient-specific
results for nonclinical uses is permitted and will not cause a
research laboratory to fall under CLIA. Providing other types of
research information—such as sharing aggregate, deidentified
research results for an entire group of participants—also is
permitted, by this view. 
The crucial point here is that the research exception parrots the
statute’s scienter requirement verbatim.488 This is why there is no
conflict between HIPAA access and CLIA’s research exception:
When responding to an individual’s request for HIPAA access, a
research laboratory is supplying information with the goal of com-
plying with federal privacy law.489 This privacy law serves various
enumerated civil-rights and economic regulatory policy objectives
discussed earlier, rather than the clinical purposes that trigger
CLIA regulation.490 It is hard to make out how the mere act of
providing HIPAA access could subject a research laboratory to CLIA
regulation.
CMS’s 2014 PDF file advances an alternative view. It suggests
that a research laboratory falls under the CLIA regulations if it
reports patient-specific results for any reason.491 It states that CMS
will presume a research laboratory to be subject to CLIA if it reports
485. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a); 42 C.F.R. § 493.2. 
486. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2).
487. Id.
488. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a) (stating the same scienter requirement).
489. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
490. See supra Part IV.
491. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 454 (“In accordance with [the
research exception at 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2)], only those facilities performing research testing
on human specimens that do not report patient-specific results may qualify to be excepted from
CLIA certification.”).
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patient-specific results and “those results will or could be used” for
clinical purposes.492 By this view, the laboratory’s intended use for
the data is irrelevant; what matters is the potential for data to be
misused by other parties after the laboratory reports it. A research
laboratory will be CLIA-regulated if it reports patient-specific data
that could be misused for clinical care by other parties such as phy-
sicians, genetic counselors, or the individual.
This view strays too far from the text of CLIA regulations to be
lawfully implemented through a guidance document.493 The 2014
PDF file does not merely interpret, but amends, the CLIA research
exception.494 Agencies can amend their regulations only after notice
and public comment, and they must publish the amended regulation
in the Federal Register at least thirty days before it takes effect.495
CMS did not heed these APA requirements. Moreover, the policy
CMS announced in its 2014 PDF file seemingly cannot be legiti-
mated via rulemaking because it is inconsistent with the jurisdic-
tional scheme of the CLIA statute itself, which only Congress can
amend.496 Nevertheless, the PDF file has had the practical binding
effect of depriving many research participants of their HIPAA access
rights.497
492. Id. (“In most cases, research testing where patient-specific results are reported from
the laboratory, and those results will be or could be used ‘for the diagnosis, prevention, or
treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings’
are presumed to be subject to CLIA absent evidence to the contrary.”). 
493. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (detailing the CLIA regulation’s basic jurisdictional rule).
494. See supra this Part.
495. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012).
496. See generally Evans & Wolf, supra note 325 (describing, in more detail, the ways that
CMS’s policy statement is inconsistent with the CLIA statute as well as other federal
statutes).
497. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (invalidating
a guidance document the Environmental Protection Agency had informally posted to its
website and noting that nonbinding guidance documents “as a practical matter, have a
binding effect” if the agency “acts as if a document issued at headquarters is controlling in the
field, if it treats the document in the same manner as it treats a legislative rule” and “if it
leads private parties ... to believe” that the agency will apply the policy expressed in the
document); see also Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J.
1311, 1323, 1327-28 (1992) (noting that nonlegislative rules—interpretive rules, policy
statements, and guidance documents—that ostensibly are not legally binding may have
practical binding effect, such that notice and comment procedures should be followed).
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3. OCR Flees Controversy
In a 2016 guidance document, OCR carefully sidestepped confron-
tation with CMS.498 The guidance described HIPAA’s access right
accurately, but it placed key parts of the discussion under a heading
that created a false impression that HIPAA’s right of access to ge-
nomic data may only apply at clinical laboratories, as opposed to
research laboratories.499 As already discussed, HIPAA’s access right
never has—and still does not—draw any distinction between re-
search and clinical laboratories as long as they are HIPAA-covered
facilities.500 Precisely because the access right applies to research
data, HIPAA provides an exception that allows a temporary delay
in access to research data during clinical trials.501 Elsewhere in the
2016 Access Guidance, OCR correctly described this narrow re-
search exception,502 and, in 2017 public statements, an OCR official
reiterated that this is the only access exception that specifically
applies to research data.503
OCR’s artfully ambiguous guidance avoided a confrontation with
CMS, but it perpetuated widespread confusion. A large class of
individuals—people whose genomes were sequenced in HIPAA-
covered research labs—has endured ongoing deprivation of a fed-
erally protected civil right: their right of access under the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.504
Civil rights enjoy a special status in U.S. federal law, exemplified
by Section 242 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which makes it a crime
for a public official acting under color of law to willfully deprive peo-
ple of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.505 The Department of Justice explains that “under color of
498. See OCR, 2016 ACCESS GUIDANCE, supra note 308. 
499. See id. (positioning discussion under the heading: “Does an individual have a right
under HIPAA to access from a clinical laboratory the genomic information the laboratory has
generated about the individual?”).
500. See supra Part VI.B.
501. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii) (2018).
502. See OCR, 2016 ACCESS GUIDANCE, supra note 308 (explaining the HIPAA access
exception at 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(2)(iii)).
503. See Conference: Return of Genetic Results in the All of Us Research Program, supra
note 407 (statement by Deven McGraw). 
504. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
505. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
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law” includes actions public officials take within their lawful
authority as well as “acts done beyond the bounds of that official’s
lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting
to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official du-
ties.”506 It is not necessary to show that the act was “motivated by
animus toward the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial sta-
tus or national origin of the victim.”507
The HIPAA access right is a law of the United States that enables
various genomic civil rights, including some—like the right of as-
sembly and right to petition the government—that are protected by
the Constitution.508 Other regulators—including safety regulators—
cannot use powers they have (or feign powers they do not have) to
interfere with it. Access to one’s own genetic information held at
HIPAA-covered laboratories is, after GINA, a federally protected
civil right.509
Nothing in this discussion is meant to suggest that federal safety
regulators have violated Section 242, at least not yet. It is a criminal
statute best known as a tool for prosecuting racist sheriffs in the
Jim Crow South.510 FDA appreciated that constitutionally sensitive
issues were at stake and deferred action on the 2014 draft guidance
that would have interfered with HIPAA access.511 CMS, in publish-
ing its 2014 PDF file, did take action under the color of law,512 and
this action has had the practical effect of depriving people of a civil
right. However, section 242, because it is a criminal statute, has a
regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States
... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily
injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section ... shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”).
506. Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 6, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/crt/deprivation-rights-under-color-law [https://perma.cc/Q76U-R2UD].
507. Id.
508. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting “the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”); see also supra notes 226-29 and
accompanying text.
509. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
510. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93 (1945). 
511. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 449
(announcing that FDA did not intend to finalize its draft LDT guidances because public
comments revealed more complexity and stakeholder resistance than FDA initially
anticipated).
512. See Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, supra note 506.
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scienter requirement.513 It requires a willful deprivation.514 Safety
regulators that have acted to block HIPAA access appear to have
mistaken it for an ill-advised consumer health and safety regula-
tion that needed to be blocked. Being mistaken is not equivalent to
being willful. HIPAA’s access right is indeed a bad safety regulation
because it is not a safety regulation at all. It is a civil rights reg-
ulation.
4. The National Academies Weigh In
As the impasse dragged into its fourth year, three federal
agencies enlisted the prestigious National Academies of Science,
Engineering, and Medicine (the “Academies”) to prepare a report on
the appropriate sharing of data generated during research with
research participants (the “Report”).515 The Report’s three sponsors
were FDA, CMS, and the NIH which is a major source of funding for
genomic research; OCR, which administers HIPAA’s access right,
was not a sponsor.516 The Academies are highly influential private
bodies that have advised the federal government on science and
medical policy issues since 1863.517 Many view them as “the nation’s
pre-eminent source of high-quality, objective advice on science,
engineering, and health matters.”518 “[R]eports of the Academies are
viewed as being valuable and credible because of the institution’s
reputation for providing independent, objective, and nonpartisan
advice with high standards of scientific and technical quality.”519
513. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
514. Id.
515. COMM. ON THE RETURN OF INDIVIDUAL-SPECIFIC RESEARCH RESULTS, NAT’L ACADS. OF
SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., RETURNING INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH RESULTS TO PARTICIPANTS: GUIDANCE
FOR A NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM (Jeffrey R. Botkin, Michelle Mancher, Emily R. Busta &
Autumn S. Downey eds., 2018) [hereinafter REPORT], http://nationalacademies.org/hmd/
reports/2018/returning-individual-research-results-to-participants.aspx?_ga=2.125510026.128
5413390.1534711400-1676621809.1532099289 [https://perma.cc/MCL5-HMQV].
516. Id. at 2.
517. Who Are We, NAT’L ACADS. SCI. ENGINEERING & MED., http://www.nationalacademies.
org/about/whoweare/index.html [https://perma.cc/YZX8-8RB6].
518. What We Do, NAT’L ACADS. SCI. ENGINEERING & MED., http://www.nationalacademies.
org/about/whatwedo/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z977-AE46].
519. Policies and Procedures, NAT’L ACADS. SCI. ENGINEERING & MED., http://www.national
academies.org/nasem/na_064188.html [https://perma.cc/EG2B-8L28].
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This Report is a rare deviation from the Academies’ usually high
standards for quality and rigor.520 The Report’s Statement of Task
(SOT)—the set of instructions that the Academies and sponsors
agree upon prior to a study521—recites the flawed position CMS
advanced in its PDF file as if it were a widely accepted truth:
“Currently, any research laboratory that returns individual-specific
research results is regulated by CLIA.”522 The Report notes that
CMS’s position is controversial, but adopts it anyway.523 The SOT
required this: it ordered that the study must “not provide any legal
interpretation or analysis regarding the scope of applicability of
CLIA.”524 In other words, do not look at the CLIA statute or ask
whether CMS’s PDF file correctly states the law.525 The Report notes
that the “sponsors indicated to the committee that it would be ap-
propriate to include in its description of the current regulatory
environment for the return of individual research results the CMS’s
current interpretation of the scope and applicability of CLIA.”526
This was an instruction for the committee to take CMS’s side in an
ongoing legal dispute. It is heartbreaking to see our nation’s trusted
Academies agree to these terms. 
The Report opens with a statement that HIPAA’s access right is
in conflict with the CLIA regulations and repeats this allegation
throughout the Report.527 This posits a regulatory conflict that does
520. See Evans & Wolf, supra note 325 (examining the root causes of this deviation).
521. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., WORKING WITH THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES: A
GUIDE FOR PROSPECTIVE STUDY SPONSORS 2, http://www.nationalacademies.org/site_assets/
groups/nasite/documents/webpage/na_069619.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TXC-2GXP].
522. See REPORT, supra note 515, at 5 (quoting the statement of task).
523. Id. at 9 (noting that legal scholars question this interpretation). 
524. Id. at 7 box S-2 (quoting the statement of task).
525. Id. at 46 (noting that “the committee was advised that making any comments,
analysis, or conclusions regarding the appropriateness of that [CMS] interpretation would be
beyond what was intended in the Statement of Task”).
526. Id. at 9.
527. Id. at 28 (stating, “[A]s currently written and implemented, the laws and regulations
governing access to laboratory test results, both clinical and research, are not harmonized”);
id. at xxvii (stating that “regulatory conflicts create dilemmas for laboratories, investigators,
and institutions” and noting the prohibition on return of results from laboratories that are not
CLIA-certified and that HIPAA may require return of results regardless of whether they were
generated in a CLIA-certified laboratory); id. at 250 tbl.6-2 (stating that a non-CLIA-certified
laboratory has a “[l]egal obligation[ ]” to make “[m]andatory disclosure under HIPAA (but the
act of disclosure then requires laboratory to become CLIA-certified)”—in other words, the
required act of providing access to data under HIPAA will trigger CLIA jurisdiction for
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not actually seem to exist.528 The Report then offers recommenda-
tions to resolve the alleged conflict. Most notably, Recommendation
12A calls on OCR (which was not a study sponsor and had not re-
quested the Academies’ advice) to redefine the Privacy Rule’s indi-
vidually accessible DRS “to include only individual research results
generated in a CLIA-certified laboratory or under the externally
accountable quality management system for research laboratories
(see Recommendation 2).”529 The problem with this recommendation
is that it is unlawful: It calls on OCR to violate GINA’s privacy pro-
visions and portions of the Public Health Service Act and the Social
Security Act that GINA introduced.530 
The Report implicitly recommends repeal of GINA’s privacy pro-
visions: it would be unlawful for OCR to implement the regulatory
changes suggested in Recommendation 12A unless Congress repeals
GINA’s genetic privacy provisions, which passed by a vote of 95-0 in
the Senate531 and 414-1 in the House.532 In 2017, the latest year for
which figures are available, the Academies received 78 percent of
their funding doing studies for federal agencies,533 and the Report
in question was 100 percent federally funded.534 It is distressing to
see the public’s funds spent on a study that seeks to strip Americans
of genetic privacy protections that Congress, by decisive margins,
enacted as part of GINA. A congressional investigation into what
went wrong here would not be out of order.
laboratories that would not otherwise be subject to the CLIA regulation). But see id. at 315
tbl.C-4 (including, in a similar statement by the Committee’s legal consultant, an important
proviso that this statement was true “according to CMS”—a proviso that the Committee
deleted in its own statement on page 250).
528. See supra Part II.
529. REPORT, supra note 515, at 267.
530. See supra Part II; see also Evans & Wolf, supra 325 (itemizing current statutes that
Recommendation 12A would violate). 
531. 154 CONG. REC. 6830, 6841 (2008).
532. Id. at 7499, 7519-20.
533. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS 59, http://www.
nationalacademies.org/annualreport/Report_to_Congress_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VHN-
AQ7V].
534. See REPORT, supra note 515, at 2 (listing three federal agencies as study sponsors). 
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B. The Ethical Imperative for Research Data Access
Lost in the recent debate is the notion that individual data access
is essential to the legitimacy and vitality of the biomedical research
enterprise. This notion has deep roots extending back to the 1977
PPSC report and to the 1997 recommendations for Congress that
HHS prepared pursuant to the HIPAA statute.535 The ethical
principles they identified grow ever more important in the current
age when biomedical discovery depends on research uses of people’s
sensitive health and genetic information. This Section aims to re-
vive these ethical principles, now often forgotten.
The PPSC and HHS ethical analyses can be summarized as
follows: If our society recognizes an ethical requirement for people
to consent to secondary uses of their data, then an individual access
right is necessary to ensure valid, informed consents.536 On the other
hand, if our society lets people’s data be used in research without
their express consent,537 people will need an individual access right
in order to protect their civil rights.538 Either way, ethical principles
weigh in favor of granting individuals a right of access to research
data held at HIPAA-covered facilities.
In its 1997 recommendations to Congress, HHS anticipated that
many research facilities would focus strictly on research and not be
involved in the provision of health care.539 In current terminology,
many research institutions would not be HIPAA-covered entities.540
Data generated at such facilities would not be subject to the access
right.541 HHS recognized, however, that some research involves the
provision of clinical health care and takes place at academic medical
centers subject to the access right.542 HHS stated its belief that “a
right to see one’s own record, properly managed, need not impair
535. See generally PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 224, ch. 15; HHS
Recommendations, supra note 195, § II.A.
536. See infra notes 544-49 and accompanying text.
537. See Kulynych & Greely, supra note 13, at 95 (explaining that genomic data are widely
used in research without individual consent).
538. See infra note 552 and accompanying text.
539. See HHS Recommendations, supra note 195, § II.A.
540. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018) (defining “covered entity”).
541. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524; see also HHS Recommendations, supra note 195, § II.C.2.
542. See HHS Recommendations, supra note 195, § II.C.2.
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research.”543 HHS recognized just one exception: situations where
individual access would “un-blind” a clinical trial.544 Apart from that
narrow research exception, HHS felt HIPAA-covered facilities
should provide individual access to research data on the same basis
as clinical data.545
The underlying ethical concern was that, without an access right,
people could not grant valid consents for their data to be used in the
growing field of informational research: “[the] “decision whether to
disclose a record may depend on what the record says, and so access
to the record is integral to making an informed choice to disclose
[information].”546 An individual access right, in HHS’s view, enabled
secondary uses of research-quality data by making valid consents
possible.547 This concern is rarely voiced today, and some research
bioethicists recommend restricting individual access to research
data.548 This perhaps reflects a world where individual consent is so
frequently waived that obtaining valid consent seems a quaint
historical concern.549
The PPSC, writing in 1977, foresaw just such a dystopian world.
In discussing individual access to data collected for research,550
PPSC felt that individual access to research data may not be war-
ranted if the information is not used to make decisions about the
individual and if the information “cannot be ... disclosed in individ-
ually identifiable form for any other purpose.”551 PPSC stressed,
however, that if research records are not “totally protected against
the possibility that individually identifiable information in them
will be disclosed for any other purpose,” individual access is “highly
relevant.”552
543. Id.
544. See id. (highlighting the need to prevent clinical trial subjects from discovering the
identity of the medication they are taking until the trial is completed); supra notes 409-15
(discussing this exception).
545. See HHS Recommendations, supra note 195, § II.C.2.
546. Id.
547. See id. 
548. See supra note 122 (providing examples of scholarly works recommending various
restrictions on individual access).
549. See Kulynych & Greely, supra note 13, at 95 (noting the prevalence of unconsented
uses of genomic data).
550. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 224, ch. 15.
551. Id. at 573.
552. Id. at 599.
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The PPSC thus articulated the concern that, forty years later,
drove Congress to enact sections 102 and 105 of GINA: data that
lack clinical significance may nevertheless have civil rights signif-
icance, subjecting people to a risk of unjust discrimination and other
adverse social consequences if inappropriately disclosed.553 Indi-
vidual access to research-quality data empowers people to protect
their civil rights in situations where researchers and research
funding agencies, in their quest to share and use data for secondary
purposes and to assemble large-scale research data commons,554
pursue data sharing practices that place individuals’ privacy at
risk.
PPSC split third-party access and individual access Solomon-
ically. PPSC concluded that unconsented research use of people’s
data is sometimes ethically justified, but it maintained that indi-
vidual access is the civil rights quid pro quo for policies that allow
such research without informed consent.555 Those policies endanger
people’s civil rights in order to advance socially beneficial research
and public health uses of their data. If protecting people’s civil
rights through rigorous consent requirements would chill scientif-
ic discovery, then at least empower people to try to protect their civil
rights as well as they can by granting them access to their own da-
ta. They have a right to know what may be shared without their
consent.
The PPSC’s 1977 recommendations also played a role in early de-
velopment of the Common Rule.556 The National Research Service
Award Act of 1974 established a National Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedicine to guide
development of the Common Rule.557 The National Commission’s
553. See supra note 176.
554. See Kulynych & Greely, supra note 13, at 108; see also Katherine J. Strandburg et al.,
Knowledge Commons and the Road to Medical Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 5 (Katherine J. Strandburg et al. eds., 2017) (discussing data
commons for use in biomedical research and public health studies); Patricia A. Deverka et al.,
Creating a Data Resource: What Will It Take to Build a Medical Information Commons?, 9
GENOME MED. 84, 84 (2017) (discussing the same). 
555. See supra notes 550-52 and accompanying text.
556. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, subpt. A. (2018). 
557. See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, §§ 201-02, 88 Stat 342, 348-50 (1974)
(enacting 42 U.S.C. § 2891-1, the precursor of today’s § 300v-1, creating the National
Commission and describing its role in developing substantive standards of human subject
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recommendations, published in 1978,558 incorporated the PPSC’s
views on research that uses existing data and biospecimens.559 The
Commission embraced the PPSC’s advice that unconsented third-
party use of people’s data and specimens is sometimes ethically
justified,560 but it ignored PPSC’s proviso that unconsented sec-
ondary use, if allowed, gives rise to an ethical duty to grant peo-
ple access to their data.561
After reviewing the Commission’s recommendations, Congress
enacted the National Research Act of 1978,562 which authorized
the Secretary of HHS to promulgate the Common Rule,563 subject
to a constraint that HHS should either follow the Commission’s
recommendations or else explain why the Secretary was rejecting
them.564 The Common Rule traditionally has allowed unconsented
access to people’s data and biospecimens for use in research without
granting them an individual access right.565 By the PPSC’s reckon-
ing, this is unethical.566 The Common Rule amendments that took
effect in January 2019 have partly addressed this lapse by deferring
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule to regulate many uses of data and
biospecimens to which the Common Rule previously applied.567 The
Privacy Rule faithfully implements the PPSC’s principle that if
researchers can obtain your data without your consent, then you
should have access, too. 
protection).
558. See Institutional Review Boards: Report and Recommendations of the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 43
Fed. Reg. 56,174 (proposed Nov. 30, 1978). 
559. See id. at 56,181.
560. See id.
561. See id.
562. See Community Mental Health Centers Extension Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-622, 92
Stat 3412 (creating a new commission to replace the expiring National Commission, with the
new commission having received Congressional instructions to maintain continuity).
563. See 42 U.S.C. § 300v-1(b) (2012).
564. Id. § 300v-1(b)(2).
565. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2016) (allowing, as part of the traditional Common Rule, an
IRB to waive individual consent to the use of people’s data in research).
566. See supra this Part.
567. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7261-62 
(Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 and in various other regulations of
implementing agencies) (adopting a new regulation at § 46.104(d)(4)(iii) that excludes
research and public health studies that are HIPAA-regulated from the Common Rule’s
jurisdiction); supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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VIII. RECONCILING SAFETY AND TRANSPARENCY
A. Statutory Basis of the Individual Access Right
Lost in the recent debate is the fact that the 2013 and 2014 rules
that expanded the Privacy Rule’s access right were implementing a
congressional civil rights mandate given in GINA.568 This fact is
indeed difficult to spot in the preamble to the 2014 final rule that
created HIPAA’s right of access to laboratory test results. The 2014
amendments went beyond what GINA required and provided ac-
cess to nongenetic as well as genetic laboratory test results.569
GINA, of course, only addressed genetic information.
The 2014 HIPAA amendments, in fact, rest on three sources of
statutory authority. First, the Administrative Simplification pro-
visions of the 1996 HIPAA statute arguably already empowered
OCR to require individual access to PHI stored at HIPAA-covered
laboratories and to include genetic information within HIPAA’s
definition of PHI.570 Second, any uncertainty about that fact was re-
solved in 2008 by GINA’s mandate for OCR to include genetic in-
formation within HIPAA’s definition of PHI and to place it under
the Privacy Rule’s protections.571 Third, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)572 included the Health Infor-
mation Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)
Act.573 HITECH established a federal advisory committee on health
information technology policy, which recommended expanding
568. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-9(a) (2012).
569. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports; Final
Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 493 and 45 C.F.R. 164). 
570. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 264(c), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033-34 (calling for Congress to implement federal health data
privacy legislation by August 21, 1999 and providing that, if Congress failed to do so, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services would have authority to promulgate the HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
571. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 105(a); see supra note 130 (discussing
GINA’s mandate to treat genetic information as “health information” for purposes of the
HIPAA regulations).
572. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115. 
573. See id. div. A., tit. XIII; id. div. B, tit. IV (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17931-17940).
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individuals’ access to their own laboratory-held data, including non-
genetic as well as genetic test results.574
The 2014 preamble discussed the HITECH and HIPAA statutes
at some length, but it did not mention GINA.575 The reason for this
omission was that GINA’s major directive—to place genetic infor-
mation under the Privacy Rule’s protections—had already been
implemented in a separate rulemaking the prior year.576 The 2014
amendments simply expanded HIPAA’s access right to include
laboratory-held PHI, which already included genetic information
following those 2013 amendments.577 The Obama Administration’s
HHS department had shepherded HIPAA’s expanded access right
through a contentious rulemaking process extending over three
years and two presidential terms578 and justifiably viewed it as an
important civil rights accomplishment.579 It was perhaps only
human for the preamble to highlight its link to the HITECH Act,
enacted shortly after Mr. Obama took office in 2009, while down-
playing the role of the Bush-era GINA statute.
Insofar as the HIPAA access right includes genetic information,
OCR acted under three sources of statutory authority: its general
authority to regulate under HIPAA, amplified by a congressional
mandate to regulate under GINA, confirmed by recommendations
574. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164) (discussing
recommendations of the Health Information Technology Policy Committee).
575. Id. at 7290-91.
576. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement and Breach
Notification Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications of the
HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5568 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160,
164) (amending the Privacy Rule to protect genetic information as defined by GINA). 
577. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 7290.
578. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 76 Fed.
Reg. 56,712 (Sept. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164)
(proposing the laboratory access right); CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’
Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed. Reg. at 7290 (finalizing this right).
579. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Strengthens Patients’
Right to Access Lab Test Reports (Feb. 3, 2014), http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/2017012
8005213/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2014/02/03/hhs-strengthens-patients-right-to-
access-lab-test-reports.html [https://perma.cc/AJ83-2Q59] (announcing the expanded access
right and labeling it a “cornerstone of the Privacy Rule”).
2100 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:2017
developed under HITECH.580 The individual’s civil right of access to
genetic information has one of the most unimpeachable statutory
pedigrees of any U.S. federal regulation: Congress thrice authorized
it. Safety regulators wishing to block this right would need to
address their concerns to Congress.
B. Safety Solutions That Preserve Civil Rights
The way forward lies in crafting policies that preserve people’s
civil right of access while making access as safe and as ethical as it
can be. The following ideas are offered simply as examples to
stimulate further discussion and debate. 
1. The Limits of Prospective CLIA Compliance as a Solution
CMS has suggested that research laboratories must comply with
the CLIA regulation, if they provide HIPAA access.581 Subjecting
research laboratories to CLIA regulation would add costs and reg-
ulatory compliance burdens without necessarily improving substan-
tive data reliability. As already discussed, CLIA does not address
clinical validity or utility.582 CLIA also may fail to ensure analytic
validity at laboratories that conduct novel genomic tests for which
proficiency testing materials do not exist or at laboratories whose
use of a research test is too brief to be captured by CLIA’s biennial
survey/inspection process.583 Requiring CLIA certification may ad-
dress a legal technicality, but it does not ensure that data from
research laboratories meet bioethicists’ concept of clinical-quality
data.
There is a deeper problem with prospective compliance. If a lab-
oratory previously operated under CLIA’s research exception, it may
hold stores of past research data. These past stores of data can nev-
er be brought into compliance with the CLIA regulations, even if the
laboratory follows CLIA requirements prospectively. The laboratory
seemingly faces costly and burdensome OCR enforcement actions if
580. See supra notes 570-74 and accompanying text.
581. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 454.
582. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
583. See supra Part III.
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it fails to honor individual’s HIPAA access rights with respect to its
old data, or a CMS enforcement action if it does.584 Individuals need
access to old as well as new data to protect their civil rights. Any
workable solution therefore must support access to past as well as
future research data.
2. Data Destruction Policies
Stored data only raise civil rights concerns for as long as they re-
main in storage. For this reason, a person’s HIPAA-accessible DRS
only includes information that is “maintained” by or for the HIPAA-
covered entity.585 Data cease to be part of an individual’s DRS if the
covered entity discards or destroys the data.586 If safety regulators
and bioethicists determine that individual access to research data
poses serious risks to research participants, one ethical solution
would be to require research laboratories to destroy data after re-
search has been completed. This solution runs counter to the de-
sire to maintain data for socially beneficial secondary uses, but it
must be mentioned as a possible pathway to protect research
participants’ civil rights while simultaneously protecting their
safety.
3. Moving Genomic Research to Non-HIPAA Research 
Facilities and Implementing Specially Tailored Privacy
Policies
If HIPAA access poses unacceptable risks to research partici-
pants, another possible solution is to protect their civil rights by
implementing strong privacy protections that prevent their data
from being used without their permission.
584. See Health Information Privacy: How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security
Rules, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 7, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/compliance-enforcement/examples/how-ocr-enforces-the-hipaa-privacy-and-
security-rules/index.html [https://perma.cc/M7L3-KHHC] (discussing OCR’s enforcement of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule); see also Health Information Privacy: All Case Examples, U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 7, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
compliance-enforcement/examples/all-cases/index.html [https://perma.cc/43JV-7QBT] (same).
585. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2014).
586. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
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HIPAA’s access right only applies at HIPAA-covered facilities.587
Many genomic research laboratories have HIPAA-covered status as
a result of being affiliated with, or being a business associate of, an
academic medical center that provides health care.588 There are
various legal and organizational options for structuring research
activities to avoid becoming HIPAA-covered. If HIPAA’s access right
poses unacceptable safety risks to research participants, one option
would be to restructure activities so that genomic research is only
carried out at non-HIPAA laboratories.
If research data were placed outside HIPAA’s privacy protections,
an alternative privacy framework seemingly would need to be
created to address privacy risks of genomic research. The HIPAA
Privacy Rule is merely a set of general privacy protections designed
for use in contexts other than genomic research. Its privacy protec-
tions are inherently weak589 and widely criticized.590 It should not be
difficult to develop specially tailored privacy policies that better
address the concerns people feel about genomic research. These
policies might include, for example, policies addressing the difficul-
ties of deidentifying genomic data and managing reidentification
risks; placing meaningful restrictions on downstream uses and re-
disclosure; requiring robust individual authorization for secondary
uses and more restrictive conditions on the granting of waivers of
individual authorization; and providing more transparency about
downstream use and storage of data than HIPAA’s weak accounting
framework provides. These specially tailored policies could be imple-
mented by moving genomic research to non-HIPAA laboratories and
then requiring the laboratories to comply with the policies as a
condition of research funding or publication in high-impact journals.
In designing such policies, the original ethical analyses of the
PPSC and HHS have continued relevance.591 According to the PPSC,
a right of individual access would be ethically unnecessary if records
were “totally protected against the possibility that individually
identifiable information in them will be disclosed for any other
587. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102, 160.103.
588. See Evans et al., supra note 352, at 799.
589. See supra Part IV.B-C.
590. See Ohm, supra note 191, at 1740.
591. See supra Part VII.B.
2019] THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT 2103
purpose.”592 However, HHS cautioned that people can grant valid
consents for secondary uses of their records only if they know what
the records contain.593 Herein lies the rub: any privacy policy that
eliminates the ethical need for individual access seemingly needs to
be even more stringent than the HIPAA Privacy Rule is. Such a pol-
icy therefore may make secondary research uses of data and the
creation of research data commons even harder than they currently
are, although it might be possible to create a highly secure “sharing
space” within which genomic researchers could share data under
an agreed set of highly rigorous data security standards.
4. Issue HIPAA Guidance to Ensure Accurate Identification of
Data in the DRS
CLIA regulations are sometimes seen as protecting against mix-
ups in which one person’s data or biospecimens are mistaken for
another’s. One concern about allowing HIPAA access to data from
non-CLIA research laboratories is that people may obtain copies of
data that are not even their own. As already noted, CLIA’s sample
and record identification requirements are modest, and many re-
search laboratories already implement procedures that are equally
if not more stringent.594 Forcing research laboratories to comply
with CLIA may add little value, in terms of avoiding mix-ups. A
better way to address this concern may be through HIPAA’s own
access procedures.
By definition, HIPAA’s DRS—the dataset an individual is entitled
to access—only includes data if the data are “about” the indi-
vidual.595 Data erroneously attributed to an individual are not
rightly part of the DRS to which the individual has a HIPAA access
right.596 It is well within OCR’s discretion to set standards to ensure
the integrity of each person’s DRS. OCR could, for example, publish
a guidance stating that a research laboratory’s data should only be
regarded as traceable to the individual, and therefore part of the
592. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, supra note 224, at 599. 
593. HHS Recommendations, supra note 195, § II.C.2.
594. See supra Part III. 
595. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2018).
596. See id.
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individual’s accessible DRS, if the laboratory used the individual’s
name and one other unique identifier for purposes of sample and
record identification—in other words, procedures equivalent to what
CLIA requires.597
Requiring CLIA-equivalent sample and record-tracking proce-
dures is not the only, or necessarily the best, policy solution that
OCR could adopt. Suppose, for example, a research laboratory used
name only, without recording a second unique identifier, when it
generated and stored a person’s genomic data in the past. Should
these data be excluded from the person’s DRS, denying the person’s
important civil right of access to the data? With genomic data, the
variant data themselves uniquely identify the individual; nobody
else has that same set of variants.598 Years later, when the person
requests HIPAA access, it would be a simple matter to retest a
small sample of the person’s variants—for example, the thirteen
CODIS markers, which the FBI uses to identify suspected criminals
with a high degree of confidence599—to ensure that the data stored
under the person’s name are, in fact, the person’s own data. Such a
procedure would resolve any lingering concerns about the potential
for mix-ups at research laboratories that failed to follow CLIA-
equivalent sampling and record-tracking procedures in the past,
while preserving people’s civil right of access to their data.
A final point is that people’s civil rights can be affected when data
are wrongly identified to them, and HIPAA access is valued as a
mechanism to help people detect and correct instances where mis-
identification has occurred.600 In most situations, people do not ac-
tually need to obtain a copy of data that have been wrongly stored
in their files; they simply need to have the wrongly attributed data
removed from their files. An OCR guidance addressing accurate
identification of data to be included in individuals’ DRS should pro-
vide that any data found to be erroneously attributed to the indi-
vidual should be promptly removed or destroyed.
597. See Chen et al., supra note 165 (describing sample identification for molecular testing
laboratories under CLIA). 
598. See Annas et al., supra note 11, at 360.
599. See What Is CODIS?, supra note 126.
600. See supra Part IV.B.
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5. Warnings, Disclosures, and Other Measures to Mitigate the
Risks of Access
Blocking access is an extreme way to address the safety concerns
that access raises. Safety regulators have a duty under federal law
to craft more nuanced solutions that address safety concerns with-
out blocking civil rights.
An example may help put things in perspective. Suppose, hypo-
thetically, that there is strong evidence that an FDA-approved drug
causes an unusually high rate of serious injuries to members of a
specific racial group. FDA’s enabling statute authorizes the agency
to impose “elements to assure safe use” (restrictions on use, sale,
and distribution) to address serious drug safety problems.601 One
way to address the safety concern would be to impose restrictions
that block members of the affected racial group from obtaining the
drug. Yet doing so would violate their civil rights. Even if FDA had
strong evidence that every single member of the group would be
injured by the drug, it is ultimately for patients and their physicians
to decide whether the potential benefits outweigh the risks. FDA
has other tools at its disposal to address safety risks without vio-
lating people’s civil rights: the FDA can require a warning in the
drug’s labeling;602 it can require Medication Guides at the point of
sale to inform consumers about the risk;603 it can send “Dear Doctor”
letters warning physicians;604 it can use the power of publicity to
alert the public to the problem;605 it can order postmarketing studies
601. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3) (2012).
602. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(1) (2018) (allowing FDA to require boxed warnings in
drug labeling for serious risks, particularly those that may result in death or serious injury).
See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (authorizing FDA to require manufacturers of approved
drugs and biologics to make safety-related labeling changes based on new safety information
that becomes available after approval of the drug or biological product).
603. See 21 C.F.R. § 208.1 (explaining that FDA can require patient labeling for
prescription drugs that raise serious and significant public health concerns).
604. See id. § 200.5 (providing for manufacturers, distributors, and FDA to mail letters to
physicians and healthcare providers, in specific formats, to notify them of important
warnings, important prescribing information, and important corrections of past information
about the drug).
605. See 21 U.S.C. § 375(b) (“The Secretary may also cause to be disseminated information
regarding food, drugs, devices, tobacco products, or cosmetics in situations involving, in the
opinion of the Secretary, imminent danger to health or gross deception of the consumer.”); see
also Shannon E. Johnson, Publicity and the FDA, An Update (1997) (manuscript at 1),
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or clinical trials to better clarify the risk.606 Title 18, section 242 of
the U.S. Code requires safety regulators to pursue civil-rights-
preserving options such as these instead of broadly denying the
rights of an entire class of consumers.
The same is true of HIPAA access. Regulators have many tools at
their disposal to address safety concerns without blocking the right.
They can require research laboratories to disclose that data pro-
vided under HIPAA’s access right may be unreliable or even
misattributed to the individual. They can require stern warnings
that the data are being provided only for civil rights purposes and
must not be used for making medical decisions. They can send “Dear
Doctor” letters advising clinicians that patients may approach them
with low-quality HIPAA access data and instructing clinicians to
resolve any doubts about the source or quality of genetic information
in favor of retesting. They can engage state medical practice boards
in developing disciplinary sanctions for physicians who act on gen-
etic findings without confirming the source of those findings. It is
entirely foreseeable that people, despite all warnings, may seek in-
terpretation of variants included in their HIPAA access files. Safety
regulators can develop publicly available quality scores for genomic
interpretation services to help steer people to the more reliable ones.
They can initiate public education campaigns to help the public
understand the limitations of research-quality data. But they can-
not, consistent with federal civil rights law, block people’s access
right.
6. Responsibilities of the Medical Profession and Medical
Practice Regulators
Subclinical-quality test results cannot lead to inappropriate med-
ical procedures unless healthcare providers cooperate in providing
such care. In a world where individuals have access to subclinical-
quality information from various sources, healthcare providers
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8846783/sjohnson.pdf?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/TF9Q-63Q3] (noting that “[a] single Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
press release announcing the dangers of a product can instantaneously alter the consumption
patterns of millions of consumers”).
606. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3) (2012).
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occupy an uncomfortable position as gatekeepers, responsible for
denying imprudent follow-up care yet fearing potential liability for
their failure to provide such care.607 At the heart of this dilemma is
the absence of a well-defined standard of appropriate follow-up care
in the situation where a worried, but asymptomatic, patient arrives
at a physician’s office with genetic test results but no other clinical
indication or history suggestive of disease.
In many instances, such patients may not meet criteria for
insurance reimbursement of confirmatory testing or follow-up
evaluation, so uncertain data may be the only data available.608
Consumer safety regulators like FDA and CMS, cannot, by them-
selves, ensure that genetic information is “safe” because safety is,
in large part, a medical practice issue. There is a need for medical
practice regulators and state legislators to engage with the problem
of establishing an appropriate standard of care in this situation. For
example, when is it appropriate for a physician to decline to assist
a patient in interpreting data of dubious provenance or quality?
Under what circumstances does a patient’s refusal (or financial
inability) to pursue follow-up testing and evaluation absolve a
physician of liability? What are the limits of a physician’s—and the
healthcare system’s—responsibility to respond to requests for
interpretive services when the underlying data were not reported for
clinical use? Are there more efficient institutional solutions for
responding to the natural curiosity individuals feel upon receiving
access to their data?
7. Covering the Costs of HIPAA Access
It is unfair to portray safety regulators as the sole force opposing
HIPAA access. It is costly and troublesome to set up an administra-
tive apparatus to receive and track individuals’ requests for access,
607. See Morgan, supra note 254, at 544 (discussing the dilemmas medical geneticists face
when confronted with patients who seek counseling based on experimental or uncertain
genomic test results, and the potential liabilities on either side of acting or not taking action). 
608. See Deverka & Dreyfus, supra note 142 (discussing the barriers to insurance
reimbursement of genomic testing); Morgan, supra note 254, at 544 (“Health insurance
coverage for medical interventions in asymptomatic individuals based on mutations detected
by experimental genomic screening is deniable unless the insurer has a written, specific policy
assuring such coverage.”).
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locate their data, and deliver the data within HIPAA’s tight thirty-
day time frame.609 Even commercial data holders complain of the
associated financial burdens.610 Many research laboratories may
have welcomed the apparent conflict between safety and civil rights
regulations, which has provided a pretext not to provide HIPAA
access.
HHS estimated that laboratories nationwide would collectively
incur costs of up to $3.2-63 million to provide HIPAA access during
the first year of implementation with these figures trending
downward over time, but still $1-60 million during the fifth year.611
It is plausible that genomic research laboratories may bear a dis-
proportionate share of these costs: they hold a large share of the
genomic data now in existence,612 and genomic data tend to be
viewed as interesting and perhaps worth the effort of filing access
requests.
Research laboratories often are funded by grants lasting just
several years. Grants do not include a budget line item for staffing
a HIPAA access office—not even while the grant is active and
certainly not after it concludes. These costs would come out of a
grant’s fixed allowance for facilities and administrative costs,613
which institutions may prefer to use for other things, such as
building new laboratories. Research laboratories and the grant
sponsors that fund them may regard HIPAA’s access right as an
unfunded federal civil rights mandate that dilutes limited research
budgets. Congress, by enacting GINA, created genomic civil rights,
and Congress may need to revisit the question of how to fund the
costs of making individual data access work.
609. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(b)(2) (2018).
610. See, e.g., Evan Sweeney, Ciox Health Sues HHS to Stop ‘Irrational’ HIPAA
Enforcement, FIERCEHEALTHCARE (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/
regulatory/ciox-health-hhs-eric-hargan-hipaa-medical-records-request-ocr-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/NY4U-37Y6] (describing a suit over the allegedly inadequate cost-based fees
data holders can charge when responding to patient access requests). 
611. See CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290, 7312-13 (Feb. 6, 2014) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164).
612. See supra Part III.
613. See 7.3 Direct Costs and Facilities and Administrative Costs, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Oct.
1, 2017), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps/html5/section_7/7.3_direct_costs_and_
facilities_and_administrative_costs.htm [https://perma.cc/7CKT-PK9L] (describing the allow-
ance for facilities and administrative costs in NIH grants).
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CONCLUSION: GINA’S OPEN FUTURE
As GINA enters its second decade, its civil rights protections are
more important than they were ten years ago: people’s genomic data
are widely used in research, often without their consent; bio-
informatics algorithms grow more efficient at reidentifying de-iden-
tified data; and progress of genetic science is expanding the range
of privacy-invasive inferences that can be drawn when data are
wrongly shared or misappropriated.
The right of autonomous individuals to inspect and receive copies
of stored data about themselves has deep roots in U.S. federal law
and rests on firm ethical principles set out in two studies commis-
sioned by the U.S Congress. Congress reaffirmed these principles in
the GINA statute, which requires people’s genomic information to
receive the full protection of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, including its
individual access provision.
Recent resistance to HIPAA’s access right appears to be based on
well-intentioned confusion about the nature of the access right. It is
the product of a congressional civil rights mandate given in GINA
and, as such, it deserves compliance and respect. If individuals’ ac-
cess to their own genetic data raises valid concerns about costs or
safety, then these concerns unquestionably need to be addressed.
But they must be addressed in ways that preserve people’s civil
rights, always bearing in mind that civil rights have never been
free, or free of risk.
